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Abstract 
 
Green energy defaults (where the uptake of renewable energy is promoted among households 
by opt-out tariffs) are gaining increasing interest with policy makers, due to the high enrolment 
rates shown in (experimental) studies. Such default choices are often justified on normative and 
behavioural grounds as although consumers express a desire and willingness to pay for green 
energy, they often fail to act on such preferences. However, what has yet to be identified is 
whether the defaults actually classify those consumers according to their preferences. This study 
presents the results of a randomised controlled experiment, in which a sample of Scottish energy 
deciders (n=518) were randomly allocated to one of three treatment conditions for renewable 
electricity (opt-in, opt-out and an active choice). The choices made under the hypothetical 
markets were then compared with the normative preferences of the participants. Findings reveal 
two important aspects: a) not all consumers who would like a green tariff remain with it when 
it is the default, and b) consumers who would not like a green tariff stick with it when it is the 
default. The first finding suggests that such behaviour is due to scepticism in the green default 
when originating from an untrustworthy choice architect (e.g. supplier). The second finding 
proposes that green defaults may have the potential to manipulate consumers into energy 
contracts against their actual preference. Findings offer new and valuable insights into the 
workings of green energy defaults never before studied. The findings highlight significant 
research and policy implications surrounding the role of green defaults. It is concluded that 
green defaults are rather context- and market-specific and, if not designed carefully, can lead to 
unwanted policy outcomes. Whereas the experience with green energy defaults indicates 
untapped potential for behavioural change, the results also suggest that default settings should 
been seen as a panacea. Ultimately, this study highlights the need for further research on green 
energy defaults to become part of public policy. 
 
Keywords: Green defaults; Behavioural economics; Renewable energy; Pro-environmental 
behaviour; Energy policy; Preferences 
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Executive Summary 
Background 
The largest contributor of anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is the energy supply 
sector, responsible for approximately 35% of all global GHG emissions in 2010 (IPCC, 2014). 
Despite recent efforts to reduce the growth of GHG emissions, the annual growth of energy 
supply sector emissions rose from 1.7%/yr in 1990 – 2000 to 3.1%/yr in 2000 – 2010 (IPCC, 
2014). Such growth rates are expected to continue with CO2 emissions from the energy supply 
sector predicted to increase from 14.4 GtCO2/yr in 2010 to between 24–33 GtCO2/yr in 2050 
(IPCC, 2014). In terms of emissions, the building sector was responsible for 9.18 GtCO2 eq in 
2010 and made up 19% of total global emissions (Lucon et al., 2014). Most of the GHG 
emissions from buildings are indirect CO2 emissions from electricity use (6.02 Gt), which 
residential contributes the majority (3.50 Gt). This shows a steady and significant rise from 0.8 
Gt in 1970 and 2.11 Gt in 1990 (Lucon et al., 2014). Along with emissions, residential buildings 
also contributed to 24% of global final energy use in 2010 (Lucon et al., 2014) and 25.4% of 
total energy consumption in EU in 2015 (Eurostat, 2017a). 
Reducing this increase in GHG emissions can be achieved through various measures, such as 
energy efficiency improvements, fossil fuel switching and emission reductions in fuel extractions 
(IPCC, 2014). However, stopping the rise of GHG concentrations requires more than a shift 
from coal to gas and improvements of fossil fuel power stations, but a shift to low GHG energy 
technologies such as renewable energy. The rapid decarbonisation of the electricity mix is a vital 
component of mitigation strategies aimed at achieving low-stabilisation levels and is seen as a 
more cost-effective strategy which can occur more rapidly than in the construction, industry or 
transport sectors (IPCC, 2014). To meet low-stabilization targets, the share of low-carbon 
electricity supply needs to increase to 80% by 2050, with almost all fossil fuel generation without 
CCS phased out by 2100 (IPCC, 2014).  
To promote the generation of renewable energy, the European Union (EU) has committed to 
a binding target of 20% of energy consumed in the EU to come from renewable sources by 
2020. Mandatory national targets vary depending on previous performance and feasibility, with 
a 15% target for renewable energy set for the UK. However in 2016, renewable sources 
accounted for only 8.9% of all energy consumed, putting the UK 26th out of the 28 EU 
countries. Looking beyond 2020 the EU has set a binding target for emissions reduction of at 
least 40% compared to 1990 levels by 2030 and sets out a new EU binding target of at least 
27% for all energy consumed in the EU to come from renewable energy by 2030. Despite voting 
to leave the EU, the UK has an even greater commitment to renewable energy, having recently 
adopted the legally binding target representing a 57% reduction in GHG emissions relative to 
1990 for the period 2028-2032 (stricter than the EU’s 2030 target). The new budget is aimed to 
enable the UK to meet its target of 80% emission reductions compared to 1990 levels by 2050.  
Although RE technologies have experienced significant cost reductions and performance 
improvements over recent years, significant investment is still needed to meet such targets. 
However, investments in UK renewable energy are set to decline by 95% between 2017 and 
2020, with investment in UK renewable energy falling by £1.1bn in 2016 alone. This is coupled 
with a withdrawing of government support for many RE technologies, raises concerns over 
future investments and its ability to meet its RE targets.  
Green electricity tariffs ―where some or all of the electricity supplied is matched by renewable 
sources by the energy supplier― offer a favourable solution (Diaz-Rainey & Ashton, 2008) as 
they are financed from those consumers that can both afford and are willing to pay (WTP) a 
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premium for renewable electricity. Green electricity tariffs are also an attractive option as studies 
have shown that consumers have a significant WTP a premium for renewable electricity in a 
number of countries, with surveys showing that between 50-90% of respondents are WTP a 
premium for renewable energy (Pichert and Katsikopoulos, 2008; Kaenzig et al., 2013). In the 
UK studies have shown up to 42% of individuals would be prepared to pay a premium for 
renewable electricity.  
However, this willingness rarely translates into actual uptake. In the UK, studies have predicted 
the green electricity market at less than 1%, with similar figures from many other countries. 
Furthermore, such low uptake has seen many energy suppliers abandon their green tariffs 
completely. To address this perceived market gap between willingness and actual uptake, several 
studies have examined the effect of having the green energy supply as the automatic ‘default’ 
tariff given to the consumer. These have all reported high enrolment figures in green energy 
when presented as the default, ranging from 39 to 69%. As a result, green energy defaults are 
becoming an increasing focus of attention from policy makers, practitioners and organisations 
interested in promoting the uptake of green electricity.  
Problem definition 
However, despite positive results, to date, all the studies into green energy defaults have heavily 
focus on the total enrolment figures in green tariff. What has not been examined in detail is 
whether the greater enrolment observed in green defaults are actually from the same individuals 
who have expressed a WTP for green energy. In other words, under a green energy default 
scenario, do all of those who expressed a WTP stick with the green default, and secondly are 
there any who stick with the green default even though it is not their preference? In short, does 
a green energy default accurately classify individuals according to their actual preferences?  
In addition, the use of defaults has been subject to ethical concerns, not least their potential to 
manipulate individuals into making choices against their preference. Studies have highlighted 
the need for further research into the role of workings of the defaults and their influences, with 
such ethical concerns also attracting the attention of the public-policy sector. Knowing whether 
green energy defaults accurately classify consumers to their preferences is critical if such defaults 
continue to be promoted and are implemented in actual electricity markets. If the effectiveness 
from green energy defaults is instead from enrolling those against their preference, then serious 
ethical issues may arise, questioning the legitimacy of this policy approach. Secondly, if there are 
still consumers who are WTP for green energy but choose to opt-out of a green tariff, identifying 
and examining the reasons behind such behaviour would be key for policy makers to increase 
the effectiveness of such green defaults. 
Aim 
The objective of this thesis is to increase our understanding of how green energy defaults work, 
primarily by identifying how decisions made under default treatments match the revealed 
preference of the consumer. The experimental design is consistent with similar studies to allow 
for comparison. The thesis aims to contribute to the growing interest in green energy defaults 
from both academics and policy makers, particularly in the context of sustainable energy use 
and climate mitigation. The following the questions guided this study: 
▪ How do electricity tariff decisions made under different default settings reflect a 
consumer’s actual/normative preference? 
▪ What are the main policy implications for green energy defaults? 
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As a result, the aim of this thesis is not to establish the specific contributing factors for the 
observations, but only to record results and provide hypothesis from literature.  
Methods  
This study presents the results of an online experiment, in which a sample of Scottish energy 
deciders (n=518) were randomly allocated to one of three treatment conditions for renewable 
electricity (opt-in, opt-out and a neutral choice). The choices made under the hypothetical 
markets were then compared with the actual preferences of the participants. 
Main findings 
The results show that 42.6% chose to enrol green energy tariff under the green default setting, 
compared to 47.6% under the standard default and 24.2% when given an active choice. Despite 
the standard default being higher than the green default, this difference was not statistically 
significant. Although these results vary from other studies, by examining how those decisions 
related to the actual preferences of the participants, possible explanations were identified (details 
below). 
A second key finding is that of those participants who stated a WTP for renewable energy, when 
this option was presented as the default, almost a fifth (18.9%) chose to opt-out. Although this 
study was not able to examine the exact reasons for such behaviour, several hypotheses are 
proposed. Of these, the setting of the experiment may have had a significant impact on the 
behaviour. UK energy consumers have very low trust in energy suppliers due to a reputation of 
excessive profiteering. Furthermore, many of those suppliers have a controversial history of 
providing premium green tariffs that offered little environmental benefits. Thus, although a 
consumer may be WTP for energy from renewable sources, if this is presented as a more 
expensive green default from an untrustworthy agent, then consumer scepticism may result in 
choosing an alternative.  
The results of this study support the key hypothesis that the longer a participant took on the 
decision, the more in line their choice was with their preferences. Secondly the results suggest 
that the lack of trust in the perceived choice architect, resulted in the participants spending more 
time and effort on decisions, even when the default matches their preference. As a result, this 
study supports previous research that claims that when consumers are sceptical about the 
default, this encourages more time and effort to be allocated into the decision making, thus 
better matching the choices made with actual preferences. 
A further finding is that over a quarter (25.9%) of those who chose to stick with a green tariff 
when presented as a default, were from participants who expressed that this would not be WTP 
for a green tariff in real life. Although without the resources to identify the exact motivations 
for such behaviour, there are several hypotheses including participant irrationality or 
unconstructed preferences. However, the results cannot overlook the identification of potential 
manipulation by the default setting. That those factors which make the default a powerful tool 
(e.g. inertia, guilt, endorsement) may be strong enough to override the actual preference of the 
individual. Such results have serious philosophical, phycological and socioeconomic concerns. 
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Conclusion 
This study aimed to increase our understanding on whether green energy defaults accurately 
match consumer behaviour to their preferences. The results highlight two key policy 
implications. First green defaults should not be seen as a panacea, and need to be 
accompanied by other policy measures to increase their effectiveness. Secondly, that the 
success of green energy defaults may work by manipulating those against their preference, 
with potentially serious ethical and socioeconomic implications. Both these implications need 
to be further investigated and researched before green defaults can be seen as a viable tool for 
environmental policy. 
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1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the background against which this research is conducted. The research 
problem which this thesis contributes to solving is defined as well as its significance explained. 
The objectives and guiding questions which this research aims to answer are then presented. 
The scope of the research is then described along with the audience for whom this work is 
relevant. The ethical considerations involved in conducting this research are then outlined. 
Finally, a disposition outlining the arrangement of the research concludes this chapter. 
1.1 Background 
The largest contributor of anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is the energy supply 
sector1, responsible for approximately 35% of global GHG emissions in 2010 (IPCC, 2014). 
Despite recent efforts to reduce the growth of GHG emissions from the sector2, the annual 
growth of emissions rose from 1.7%/yr in 1990 – 2000 to 3.1%/yr in 2000 – 2010 (IPCC, 2014). 
This accelerated growth can be attributed mainly to rapid economic growth (subsequent higher 
demand for heat, power and transport) and an increased use of coal in the global energy mix. 
Such growth rates are predicted to continue with CO2 emissions from the energy supply sector 
predicted to increase from 14.4 GtCO2/yr in 2010 to between 24–33 GtCO2/yr in 2050 (IPCC, 
2014). The available supply of fossil fuels alone will not be enough to limit the concentrations 
of CO2 to 450 ppm, 550 ppm, or 650 ppm levels3. Residential buildings are one of the largest 
consumers of energy, contributing to 24% of global final energy use in 2010 (Lucon et al., 2014). 
In terms of emissions, the building sector was responsible for 9.18 GtCO2 eq in 2010 and made 
up 19% of total global emissions (Lucon et al., 2014). Most of the GHG emissions from 
buildings are indirect CO2 emissions from electricity use (6.02 Gt), which residential contributes 
the majority (3.50 Gt). This represents a steady and significant rise from 0.8 Gt in 1970 and 2.11 
Gt in 1990 (Lucon et al., 2014). In the European Union (EU), households contributed to 25.4% 
of total energy consumption in 2015 (Eurostat, 2017a).  Despite recent improvements, electrical 
consumption by EU householders has fallen just 0.9% from 2005-2015 (Eurostat, 2017a).  
Reducing the increase in GHG emissions can be achieved through various measures, such as 
energy efficiency improvements, fossil fuel switching and emission reductions in fuel extractions 
(IPCC, 2014). However, stopping the rise of GHG concentrations requires a radical 
transformation of the conventional energy supply systems (IPCC, 2014). A shift from coal to 
gas and improvements of fossil fuel power stations are not enough to stabilize the 
concentrations (IPCC, 2014). Such stabilization can only occur if CO2 concentrations in the 
atmosphere peak and decline towards zero. For this to happen, low GHG energy technologies 
such as renewable energy are essential to achieving this (IPCC, 2014). 
Decarbonizing the generation of electricity and is a vital component of mitigation strategies 
aimed at achieving low-stabilisation levels (430–530 ppm CO2 eq), and is seen as a more cost-
effective strategy which can occur more rapidly than in the construction, industry or transport 
sectors (IPCC, 2014). To meet low-stabilization scenarios, the share of low-carbon electricity 
supply needs to increase to 80% by 2050, with almost all fossil fuel generation without CCS 
phased out by 2100 (IPCC, 2014). Along with reduced GHG emissions, renewable energy can 
                                                 
1 The energy supply sector comprises “all energy extraction, conversion, storage, transmission, and distribution processes that 
deliver final energy to the end-use sectors (industry, transport, and building, as well as agriculture and forestry)” (IPCC, 2014, 
p. 516). 
2 Such efforts include the Kyoto Protocol and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).  
3 CO2 concentration levels of 450, 550, or 650 ppm, correspond to respective ranges of global warming of around 1.2° to 2.3°C, 
1.5° to 2.9°C, and 1.7° to 3.2°C over the next 100yrs (O'Neill & Oppenheimer, 2002). 
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have many co-benefits over conventional fossil fuels. These include economic benefits such as 
increased energy security and increased local employment (Bruckner et al., 2014). There are also 
social benefits such as reduced air pollution, fewer mining accidents and increased energy access. 
Renewable energy can also lead to further environmental benefits to ecosystems, such as 
reduced air and water pollution (Bruckner et al., 2014). However, RE technologies can also have 
adverse side-effects depending on their technology and location4. 
To combat climate change, global leaders have committed to measures to promote the 
generation of renewable energy. The EU has committed to a binding target of 20% of energy 
consumed in the EU to come from renewable sources by 20205. Mandatory national targets vary 
depending on previous performance and feasibility, with targets ranging from 10% for Malta to 
a high of 49% for Sweden. For the UK the target is 15%, based on previous rates of 1.3% in 
2005. To achieve the 15% target for renewable energy, the UK Renewable Energy Plan has set 
targets for renewable contributions in various sectors, which include 30% renewable electricity 
generation, 12% renewable heat and 10% renewable transport by 20206. In 2016, renewable 
sources accounted for 24.6% of electricity, 6.2% of heat, and 4.5% of transport fuel 
consumption, equating to 8.9% of all energy7. This puts the UK 26th out of the 28 EU countries 
and lags behind the EU renewable electricity average of 28.8% (Eurostat, 2017b). 
Looking beyond 2020 the EU has set a binding target for emissions reduction of at least 40% 
compared to 1990 levels by 2030. The new framework also sets out a new EU binding target of 
at least 27% for all energy consumed in the EU to come from renewable energy by 20308. 
Despite the UK voting to leave the EU it is unlikely that this will reduce the UK’s environmental 
commitment to renewable energy. Shortly after the UK voted to leave the EU, the UK 
government adopted the legally binding 5th Carbon Budget for the period 2028-20329. Carbon 
budgets set a restriction on the maximum level for the total GHG emissions the UK can emit 
over a five-year period. The 5th budget set a target representing a 57% reduction in GHG 
emissions relative to 1990 levels (1,725 MtCO2e). Although the budget is lower that the Climate 
Change Committee’s10 2015 recommendation of 1,765 MtCO2e, this is stricter than the EU’s 
carbon emissions target of 40% by 2030 the UK had signed up to. The new budget is aimed to 
enable the UK to meet its target of 80% emission reductions compared to 1990 levels by 2050 
as part of the 2008 Climate Change Act. The UK has already committed to reaching its next 
renewable electricity target due to the long lead in times associated with many RE technologies, 
with subsidy contracts and planning permission granted to many new wind farms needed to 
reach the 30% renewable electricity goal. However as mentioned significant investment is 
needed. Studies have found that investment in UK renewable energy between 2017 and 2020 is 
                                                 
4 These include matching demand with supply from solar PV and wind, human displacement from large hydro, habitat impact 
of hydro, wildlife and landscape impacts from wind, as well as increased use of critical metals (Bruckner et al., 2014). Though 
many of these impacts cannot be eliminated completely, they can be minimised and mitigated through appropriate selection 
of RE technology, positioning of facilities and operational adjustments. 
5 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy 
from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC 
6 National Renewable Energy Action Plan for the United Kingdom. Article 4 of the Renewable Energy Directive 2009/28/EC  
7 Digest of UK Energy Statistics (DUKES) 2016, Renewable sources of energy, Renewable sources data used to indicated 
progress under the 2009 EU Renewable Energy Directive. 
8 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable 
sources (recast) COM/2016/0767 final/2 - 2016/0382 (COD) 
9 The Carbon Budget Order 2016 
10 The Committee on Climate Change (CCC) is an UK independent, statutory body established under the Climate Change Act 
2008. Its purpose is to advise both the UK and devolved Government and Parliaments on emissions targets and to report 
to Parliament on the progress in reducing GHG emissions as well as preparing for climate change. 
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set to decline by 95% (Benton, 2016). Investment in UK renewable energy fell by £1.1bn in 
2016 alone, attributed not to the reduced cost of renewables but to a reduction of planned 
projects. This is coupled with a withdrawing of government support for many RE technologies 
such as onshore wind11 and solar PV12, raising concerns over future investments and ability for 
the UK to meet its targets. 
Investment 
Renewable energy (RE) technologies have experienced significant cost reductions and 
performance improvements over recent years (IPCC, 2014). This has not only allowed 
substantial large scale deployment for renewable energy technologies but also cost 
competitiveness with conventional energy sources (IRENA, 2015). The levelized cost of solar 
PV and offshore wind has fallen dramatically in the last 10 years so that they have reached grid 
parity in certain situations. However, such trends have not been observed for other RE 
technologies. While policies aimed at driving RE have been successful, many still need direct 
financial support such as feed-in tariffs, quota obligations and auctioning, or from indirect 
support from carbon taxes and other methods to internalize externalities (IPCC, 2014).  
Diaz-Rainey and Ashton (2008) mention several ways that investments in renewable electricity 
can be promoted. The first is through general taxation, however this is unlikely in many 
countries due to the political implications of raising taxes and inefficiency of subsidies. Second 
a universal levy on all electricity consumers. However, this is also controversial regarding 
conflicts with those in poverty and already struggling to pay their energy bills. Third, setting a 
mandated minimum limit for energy generation to come from renewable sources. However 
similar to previous policy, the extra costs are ultimately passed on to consumers through higher 
electricity rates. Finally, there are green electricity tariffs, where some or all of the electricity 
supplied is matched by renewable sources by the energy supplier (Diaz-Rainey & Ashton, 2008). 
Such tariffs are favoured as they allow consumers that can both afford and are willing to pay 
(WTP) a premium for renewable electricity the opportunity to choose a green energy tariff. As 
a result, the costs of the renewable energy generation are borne by those consumers, reducing 
the levy on those that either cannot afford, or do not want a green tariff (Diaz-Rainey & Ashton, 
2008). Furthermore, in a liberalized market, competition between suppliers can keep the costs 
competitive for consumers.  
Green electricity tariffs 
The green electricity tariff is an attractive option as studies have shown that consumers have a 
significant willingness to pay a premium for renewable electricity in a number of countries 
(Table 1), with surveys showing that between 50-90% of respondents are willing to pay a 
premium for RE (Pichert and Katsikopoulos, 2008; Kaenzig et al., 2013). Diaz-Rainey and 
Ashton (2008) carried out a survey in the UK in 2003 and found that 42% of participants would 
be willing to pay 5-10% more for green electricity from renewable sources. This is similar to an 
earlier survey by Batley et al. (2000) which found that for those who identified as being 
environmentally aware, 35.9% would be willing to pay extra for energy from renewable sources, 
with an average premium of 19.1%.  
 
                                                 
11Written statement to Parliament. Ending new subsidies for onshore wind (2015). 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/ending-new-subsidies-for-onshore-wind 
12Press release. Controlling the cost of renewable energy (2015). https://www.gov.uk/government/news/controlling-the-cost-
of-renewable-energy 
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Table 1 Studies finding positive WTP for renewable energy 
Country Author (year) Country Author (year) 
Australia Ivanova (2013) Japan Nomura and Akai (2004) 
Canada Rowlands et al. (2003)  Norway Navrud and Brate (2007) 
Chile Aravena et al. (2012) Slovenia Zoric and Hrovatin (2012) 
China Guo et al. (2014) South Africa Oliver et al. (2011); Chan et al. (2012) 
China Zhang and Wu (2012) South Korea Yoo and Kwak (2009); Kim et al. (2012); Lee and Heo 
(2016)  
Finland Kosenius and Ollikainen (2012) Spain Solino et al. (2009); Hanemann et al. (2011); Gracia et 
al. (2012) 
Germany Pichert and Katsikopoulos. 
(2008); Kaenzig et al. (2013)  
Sweden Hansla et al. (2008) 
Greece Zografakis et al. (2010); 
Kontogianni et al. (2013)  
UK Batley et al. (2000); MacMillan et al. (2006); Diaz-
Rainey and Ashton (2008); Longo et al. (2008); Scarpa 
and Willis (2010) 
Italy Bollino (2009); Cicia et al. (2012); 
Bigerna and Polinori (2014) 
US Borchers et al. (2007); Duffy et al. (2007); Whitehead 
and Cherry (2007); Li et al. (2009) Komarek et al. 
(2011); Mozumder et al. (2011) Susaeta et al. (2011); 
Aldy et al. (2012) 
 
However, this willingness rarely translates into uptake. Although actual figures on the market 
share of green electricity is not available for the UK, Diaz-Rainey and Ashton (2008) find that 
the results from their survey indicated the UK green energy market figures at only around 0.3%. 
This is similar to earlier UK studies such as Bately et al. (2000), which reported similar market 
shares (0.5%). In more recent studies, Hast et al. (2014) estimate the uptake of green tariffs in 
the UK was less than 1% in 2011. Similar low enrolments have been found in other countries 
offering green tariffs, including Finland (0.4%), Switzerland (2%), Australia (1%), and 2.8% in 
the US (Bird et al., 2001; Hetter & Nicholas, 2013). 
In the UK, this gap between WTP and actual behaviour has had a significant effect. Previously 
many of the major UK energy suppliers offered a green tariff in one form or another (Graham, 
2006). However, by 2015 all the major energy companies had abandoned their green electricity 
tariffs (Bawden, 2015). This coincided with UK legislation limiting the number of tariff offerings 
to four (OFGEM, 2014a). Although the UK energy regulator stated that this was not itself a 
ban on green tariffs (OFGEM, 2013), considering the low uptake it was not surprising the green 
tariffs were dropped. As those major energy companies currently make up 85% of the market 
share (OFGEM, 2015), current availability of green tariff is limited to smaller specialist suppliers 
(OFGEM, 2016) whose premiums in most cases are significantly greater than those that were 
offered by the major companies (Graham, 2006; GreenElectricityMarketplace). Therefore the 
lack of green tariffs currently offered by the major suppliers can be seen as a potentially 
significant barrier to green energy uptake. 
1.2 Problem definition 
In order to address the perceived market gap between willingness and actual uptake, several 
studies have examined the effect of having the green energy supply as the automatic default 
given to the consumer. A default can be defined as “the alternative the consumer receives if he/she does 
not explicitly request otherwise” (Brown and Krishna, 2004, p. 530). Thus, in the context of 
renewable energy, a green energy default is when the automatic tariff provided to the consumer 
is supplied from a greater share of renewable electricity than the standard tariff (more details of 
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defaults and green tariffs can be found in chapter 2). Such studies into green energy defaults 
have all reported high enrolment figures in green energy when presented as the default, ranging 
from 39 to 69% (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008; Momsen & Stoerk, 2014; Hedlin & Sunstein, 
2015; Ebeling & Lotz, 2015; Vetter & Kutzner, 2016;). As a result, green energy defaults are 
becoming an increasing focus of attention from policy makers and organisations interested in 
promoting the uptake of green electricity (Carlsson & Johansson-Stenman, 2012). 
However, what has not been examined in scientific literature is whether the greater enrolment 
in a green default is from the same individuals who have expressed a WTP for green energy. In 
other words, under a green default scenario, do all of those who expressed a WTP stick with 
the green default, and secondly are there any who stick with the green default even though it is 
not their preference? In short, does a green energy default accurately classify individuals 
according to their actual preferences?  
Such concerns regarding the effect of defaults were first raised by Johnson and Goldstein (2003) 
in arguably the most well-known study into default effects, that on automatic enrolment for 
organ donation. Although not examined in the scope of their study, they highlight that defaults 
can lead to two types of misclassification; willing donors that are not identified and those that 
become organ donors against their wishes. Johnson and Goldstein (2003) state that balancing 
these errors leads to delicate ethical and psychological questions about the default effect. They 
highlight the need for further research into the role of workings of the defaults and their 
influences. Such ethical concerns are also highlighted by Brown and Krishna (2004), who state 
that the default has attracted a lot of interest from the public-policy sector due to concerns it 
can be made to cause consumers to unintentionally deviate from their true preferences 
depending on the default setting. 
Knowing whether green energy defaults accurately classify consumers to their preferences is 
critical if such defaults continue to be promoted and are implemented in actual electricity 
markets. As green energy tariffs are in most cases more expensive than the standard offering 
(Hast et al., 2014), policy evaluation is needed so policy makers have better information about 
expected outcomes and (potential) adverse effects. With many energy users (even in the Western 
world) living below the poverty line and struggling to pay energy bills (Pye et al., 2015), policy 
makers would want evidence to show that green defaults work effectively by enrolling those 
who have expressed a preference towards paying for a premium green tariff. If the effectiveness 
from green energy defaults instead comes from recruiting those that cannot afford, are unaware, 
or are influenced against their preference, serious ethical issues may arise. Secondly, if there are 
still consumers who are WTP for green energy but choose to opt-out of a green tariff, identifying 
and examining the reasons behind such behaviour would be key for policy makers to increase 
the effectiveness of such green defaults. 
1.3 Objective and Research Questions 
The aim of this thesis is to increase our understanding on how green energy defaults work, 
primarily by identifying how decisions made under default treatments match the actual 
preference of the consumer. In particular, emphasis is placed on the green default tariff. The 
research was conducted in Scotland for a number of reasons. First, there was no language 
barrier, as well as an existing knowledge of the local energy market. Secondly, Scotland has one 
of the highest proportion of internet users in Europe, therefore increasing the validity for the 
use of online survey experiments. Furthermore, the sample size required for Scotland matched 
the resources of this thesis. Finally, as part of the UK, Scotland has a liberalized energy market 
similar to many other countries, increasing the external validity of the study.  
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To that end, an online survey experiment of Scottish energy decision makers (n=518) was 
condicted. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions, green 
default, standard default or active choice. Participants were then asked whether their electricity 
tariff in real life was green or standard and, if not already green, would they like a green tariff at 
a premium. Finally for those participants who stated they would not like a green energy tariff in 
real life, they were asked to provide the main reasons. 
The structure of the experimental conditions was designed to reflect real life markets without 
being too specific to a Scottish context that it would reduce the external validity of the findings. 
As a result, the findings may be applicable to other countries with similar liberalized energy 
markets. However as discussed in the findings, the results may be influenced by the low trust 
and previous controversial experience of green electricity in the UK energy supply sector, which 
could limit generalizability. The experimental design is in line with similar studies to allow for 
comparison. However, emphasis was placed on real world setting and representative market 
prices. The data was collected through an online panel, however there are various 
methodological challenges related to this approach, which are discussed in more detail in chapter 
5.6. 
The following research questions guide this research: 
▪ RQ 1. How do electricity tariff decisions made under different default settings reflect 
a consumer’s actual/normative preference? 
 
▪ RQ  2.  What are the main policy implications for green energy defaults? 
As a result, the aim of this thesis is not to establish the specific contributing factors for the 
observations, but only to record results and provide hypothesis from literature. As most other 
studies on green energy defaults have been from largely hypothetical market settings or from 
participants not representative of the population, by examining energy decision makers 
specifically, and in a different setting to other experiments, it is expected the results to deviate 
somewhat from previous studies.  
1.4 Scope  
The participants for the online survey came from a panel of the Scottish population. The study 
was designed to reflect a real-world market scenario and energy prices. However the survey 
design was not designed to be so specific to the Scottish context that it reduced the external 
validity. The study is only examining electricity from renewable sources and not other forms of 
renewable energy. The data was collected via an online survey conducted over one week in July 
2017. The timing of the data collection is not expected to have influenced the results. The 
participants were Scottish householders and members of an online panel company, who was 
hired to gather the data. The data only includes those participants who identified themselves as 
responsible for the energy decisions in their household. As no data exists or is available on the 
demographics of Scottish energy customers, it is unclear how representative the sample is of the 
target population. The research data was from an online randomised control experiment, 
followed up by questions regarding revealed preferences. The sample size is large enough for 
the effect size observed (see methodology).  
It is not within the scope of this thesis to test for specific causations of the observations. Such 
testing is complex and requires greater resources than this thesis had access to. However, the 
thesis will suggest and provide hypotheses on potential contributing factors in accordance with 
relevant literature. This will give the grounds for further research. 
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1.5 Audience 
This research is primarily intended for energy policy makers considering the use of green energy 
defaults. Given the design of the experiment, the results are applicable to not only policy makers 
in the UK, but also in other countries with similar liberalized residential energy markets. The 
results will not only add to existing research on potential enrolment from a green default, but 
will highlight key policy implications previously unstudied. By examining how green defaults 
classify consumers according to their preferences, this research will highlight any potential 
ethical issues that green defaults may produce. By highlighting such issues, this will serve as to 
inform how policy makers can design a green energy default that is both effective and fair.  
Secondly academics and researchers can benefit from the findings of this thesis as it serves to assess 
whether the current practice of assessing the performance of green energy defaults on total 
enrolment is a viable indicator of their success. Results from this thesis could justify that 
approach or call for a new assessment method. Furthermore, by examining such behaviour can 
generate new avenues of future research. 
Lastly, the results of this study can be of benefit to energy suppliers. Energy suppliers considering 
introducing voluntary green energy defaults, can like policy makers, use these results to better 
design such initiatives. Secondly, even if not considering green defaults, the results still provide 
valuable information regarding the current demand, WTP, and attitudes towards for green 
electricity tariffs. 
1.6 Ethical considerations 
The ethical considerations can be split into two parts. First the ethics involved in conducting 
online survey experiments. Consent by participants to be in the survey can be established 
through their voluntary membership of the panel provider and were free to choose whether to 
take part in the survey or not. A brief description of the survey was provided so that participants 
could decide whether they wished to participate or not. Participants were free to withdraw from 
the survey at any time. All participants were 18 or over. All participants were anonymous, this 
was stated at the beginning of the survey. Although a response ID was recorded, there was no 
way of identifying the individual participant from this ID. No identifying or sensitive data was 
recorded (i.e. name, home address, phone, email address or IP address). The funding source for 
the research is clearly stated in the acknowledgements. The full survey is provided in the 
appendix including the exact wording and sequencing of questions. A description of how the 
sample size was calculated, selected and the location and date of data collection are all provided.  
The second ethical consideration regards the concept of the subject of the thesis, nudging (an 
agent aiming to influence an individual’s preference through changing how a decision is framed 
or presented). There is a growing debate regarding the ethics of default settings in policy making 
which are discussed in more detail in chapter 2. 
1.7 Disposition 
This paper is organised as follows: Chapter 2 provides a background to behavioural economics 
and its use in policy, as well as a description of the key theories guiding this research. 
Furthermore a review of the existing research in this area which set this thesis in context with 
other studies is provided. Finally, an overview of the key ethical considerations regarding the 
topic under analysis is provided. Chapter 3 describes the experimental design used in this study 
and the research methods for data collection and analysis. Chapter 4 presents the main results 
of the research. Chapter 5 discusses the findings in relation to the research questions and other 
research. Hypothesis of the results observed are presented in relation to current theory and 
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knowledge. Finally, chapter 6 summarizes the main findings of this research and its implications 
for both academia and policy makers, ending with avenues for further research. 
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2 Conceptual Framework 
This chapter first introduces the principal theoretical premise and concepts that guide this study. 
Then it shows how those theories and concepts, along with others, are applied to environmental 
policy making. A review of published studies on the subject is then presented.  Finally, a brief 
overview of the main ethical considerations of using such policy tools are presented. 
2.1 Behavioural Economics  
Neoclassical economics has long been the dominant force in economic theory, assuming that 
individuals make rational decisions acting in their own self-interest. Behavioural economics (BE) 
is a relatively new and growing field of modern economics (Thaler, 2015), which contrasts 
neoclassical economic theory using phycological insights into human behaviour to better explain 
economic decision-making13. Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman (2012) state three key assertions 
of BE: 
1. Human behaviour can be influenced by perceived fairness and social norms, as a result 
personal behaviour is not motivated by utility maximisation alone.  
2. People act in a social context; an individual’s behaviour is motivated through issues such 
as social status and approval by others.  
3. Individuals have cognitive limitations and abilities, which can result in irrational decision 
making. 
 
The remainder of this chapter will provide more detail of these key concepts of behavioural 
economics related to this study, before later describing how they are applied in public policy. 
Bounded Rationality 
An adoption of neoclassical economics is rational choice theory, which states that individual 
choices and preferences are based on the assumption that individuals are rational choosers (von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). Rational choice theory states that individuals have clear 
preferences that are unaffected by how alternatives are framed or described. Furthermore, that 
individuals have access to all available information regarding the costs and benefits of each 
alternative. Based on this, individuals can compare the utility of all available alternatives and will 
choose based on the option that maximises their utility.  
However, many studies have shown that human behaviour repeatedly violates the principals of 
RCT, most notably the works of Nobel prizing winning Daniel Kahnemann and Amos Tversky 
(Tversky, 1969; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 84; Kahneman et al., 
1991; Kahneman, 2003; Tversky & Shafir, 1992). Their research built on the earlier work of 
another Nobel prize winner, Herbet Simon, who in the 1950s argued that due to the cognitive 
limitations in processing information and the complexity of the environment, utility maximising 
is almost always unrealistic (1955; 56). This led Simon to coin and define the theory of bounded 
rationality (1955; 57; 79). In Simon’s theory of bounded rationality there are two factors, one 
                                                 
13 For a more complete definition, Herbet Simon in his 1982 book, Models of Bounded Rationality: Empirically grounded 
economic reason, states that “Behavioural economics is concerned with the empirical validity of these neoclassical 
assumptions about human behaviour and, where they prove invalid, with discovering the empirical laws that describe 
behaviour correctly and as accurately as possible. As a second item on its agenda, behavioural economics is concerned with 
drawing out the implications, for the operation of the economic system and its institutions and for the public policy, of 
departures of actual behaviour from the neoclassical assumptions. A third item on its agenda is to supply empirical evidence 
about the shape and content of the utility function (or of whatever construct will replace it in a empirically valid behavioural 
theory) so as to strengthen the predictions that can be made about human economic behaviour. Thus, behavioural economics 
is best characterized not as a single specific theory but as a commitment to empirical testing of the neoclassical assumptions 
of human behaviour and to modifying economic theory on the basis of what is found in the testing process” (p. 278) 
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cognitive and the other ecological; "Human rational behaviour is shaped by a scissors whose two blades 
are the structure of task environments and the computational capabilities of the actor" (Simon, 1990, p. 7).  
One of the main consequences of the theory of bounded rationality is satisficing behaviour. 
Originally proposed by Simon (1956), it claims that decision makers satisfice (a combination of 
satisfy and suffice), stating that “organisms adapt well enough to ‘satisfice’; they do not, in general, 
“optimise”” (p. 129). Therefore, individuals can satisfy a number of specific needs without 
elaborate decision-making mechanisms such as utility functions or calculations for marginal 
rates of substitution14. Satisficing claims that individuals have limited information, time and 
computational abilities, and therefore when a search finds the first alternative which meets or 
exceeds the conditions of the search, the search is stopped and the action for that condition will 
be performed. As a result, satisficing results in decision making which is “good enough’’, as 
opposed to the outcome with the maximum benefits15. 
Simon suggests that under the satisficing approach individuals use heuristics to aid the choice 
of alternatives (Simon, 1972). Heuristics are cognitive strategies that use mental shortcuts to 
simplify decision making.  When individuals are making decisions under uncertainty they apply 
heuristics, with associated cognitive bias (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973;74). Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) conclude by stating that “these heuristics are highly economical and usually effective, 
but they lead to systematic and predictable errors” (p. 1131). However certain authors (most notably 
Gerd Gigerenzer) have argued more in favour of heuristics (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002; 
Gigerenzer, 2008). Gigerenzer has argued that heuristics are not always irrational and that one-
reason making heuristics16 used in such satisficing behaviour can in certain situations outperform 
the classical rationality (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996)17. 
Prospect Theory 
In their seminal paper, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) develop a descriptive model and 
technique for decision making under risk which they called Prospect Theory. This explained 
some of the major violations of the previous expected utility theory (EUT) as a model for 
decision making under risk. EUT had previously dominated as the descriptive model for 
decision making under uncertainty. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) later developed a newer 
version of prospect theory, called cumulative prospect theory. This incorporates the cumulative 
functional also incorporate uncertain as well as risky prospects.  
 
 
                                                 
14  The utility function ranks alternatives according to both the welfare and preferences of an individual, while the marginal rate 
of substation is the rate at which an individual can exchange one good for another without diminishing the level of utility. 
15 However, utility maximising behaviour can have downsides as those who maximise can be less satisfied than those non-
maximisers (satisficers) with consumer decisions, as well as negative correlations between maximization and optimism, 
happiness, self-esteem and life satisfaction. (Schwartz et al, 2002)  
16 “One-reason decision making” is a label for a class of fast and frugal heuristics that base decisions on only one reason. These heuristics do not 
attempt to optimally fit parameters to a given environment; rather, they have simple structural features and “bet” that the environment will fit 
them.” Gigerenzer et al. (2008) 
17 Indeed, Gerd Gigerenzer presents a negative view of behavioural economic in general, stating that “Despite producing prolific 
documentation of deviations from neoclassical norms, behavioural economics has produced almost no evidence that deviations are correlated with 
lower earnings, lower happiness, impaired health, inaccurate beliefs, or shorter lives.” (Berg & Gigerenzer, 2010) 
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In prospect theory, value is assigned to the gains or losses, as opposed to the final assets. There 
are three key elements of the value function of prospect theory: 
1) Reference dependence. The value function is defined through deviations from the 
reference point.  
2) Diminishing sensitivity. The curve is concave for gains and convex for losses. Hence 
the marginal value of both gains and losses decreases as their size increases. The impact 
of a change diminishes the further the distance from the reference point.  
3) Loss aversion. The slope of the value function at the origin is significantly steeper in 
the negative domain than in the positive domain. As a result, losses loom larger than 
corresponding gains. 
 
As a result, the value function of prospect implies an asymmetrical S shape curve, as depicted 
in Figure 1 below;  
 
Figure 1 Value function in prospected theory 
Source: adapted from Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
Loss aversion 
As mentioned, loss aversion was first formalised in prospect theory. Individuals deviate from 
EUT by interpreting outcomes as gains and losses in relevance to a reference point, as well being 
more sensitive to losses than corresponding gains. This leads to a basic phenomenon that choice 
under risk and uncertainty results in losses looming larger than corresponding gains (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1984; Tversky and Kahneman; 1991). This has been found to account for 
differences of up to 2 :1 (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). As preferences are dependent on how 
the outcomes are framed, this violates the key conditions of utility theory (Samuelson & 
Zeckhauser, 1988). Loss aversion has been found in a range of field data (Camerer, 2000) 
including housing markets (Genesove & Mayer, 2001) and investment decisions (Barberis et al., 
2001). These risks, costs or losses can be not only financial, but also social, environmental and 
time (Frederiks et al., 2015). Loss aversion implies a status quo bias and can help produce inertia 
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 37). However as discussed later, the bias towards the status quo 
can be induced in the absence of loss aversion. 
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Endowment effect 
Classical economic theory assumes that (when income effects are small and no transaction 
costs), differences between an individual’s maximum willingness to pay (WTP) for a good and 
their minimum compensation or willingness to accept (WTA) should be negligible. However, 
studies have shown discrepancies observed between WTA and WTP, that the minimum 
compensation an individual demands to give up a good can be several times greater than the 
maximum amount they are WTP (Knetsh & Siden, 1984). This increased value of a good 
through ownership was defined by Thaler (1980) who labelled this discrepancy as the 
‘endowment effect’. The endowment effect is a key consequence of loss aversion in that the 
associated utility of giving up a good is greater than the utility gained by receiving it (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1979; 91).  
Responding to earlier studies that reported that the endowment effect can be diminished with 
experience (Coursey et al., 1987), Kahneman et al. (1990) examined whether the endowment 
effect still occurs in market settings when consumers have the chance to learn. Not only did 
they show that the endowment effect still occurs, but they also find evidence of what they term 
‘instant endowment’, that the consumer’s reference point is shifted instantaneously when given 
possession of a good. This based on previous work which had only looked at goods that had 
been in possession for a lengthy period of time.  
However, although endowment can have a significant effect, studies have shown that other 
factors such as market experience or knowledge can reduce the endowment effect (List, 2003; 
Löfgren et al., 2012). However, as Kahneman et al. (1990) state, endowment effects and loss 
aversion are fundamental characteristics of human behaviour and cannot be truly eliminated by 
experience or market discipline.  
Status Quo Bias  
Loss aversion and the endowment effect can influence inertia, however they are not the only 
factors. First termed by Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988), the status quo bias hypothesises that 
decision makers exhibit a significant preference for the status quo alternative. Samuelson and 
Zeckhauser show how the status quo bias can be explained through three main categories; (1) 
rational decision making; (2) cognitive misconceptions; and (3) psychological commitment.  
1) It is important to note that sticking with the status quo can be explained as rational decision 
making in many situations (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). First, where the switch from the 
status quo occurs costs that exceed the potential gain from a more beneficial alternative. These 
transaction costs can occur in many ways. On a social level, the economic costs of switching to 
more productive practices can outweigh the alternative benefits. Examples include switching 
from the imperial to metric systems. Private transaction can also occur if an economic 
transaction leads to an investment that cannot be fully reversed (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 
1988). For example, if an employee had to undergo substantial training unique for that specific 
position/company, then both the employee and employer would be linked in irreversible mutual 
investment.  
When the possible alternatives in the decisions making process are uncertain or unknown, then 
prevalence to the status quo can also occur. Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) use the example 
that an individual will remain at a low paying job if the process of finding a better paid one is 
uncertain. Uncertainty also exists in the utility derived from the alternative. As long as the choice 
provides an adequate level of utility and proves reliable, then individuals will remain loyal even 
if potentially more optimal alternatives exist. For example, the utility that a new holiday 
destination provides can be seen as uncertain; therefor individuals will instead accept certain 
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negative aspects of a previous destination and keep returning year on year as long as meets a 
certain level of utility. 
Choosing to undertake an analysis to determine whether to switch from the status quo can be 
seen as a decision itself (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). As a result, if the cost of the decision 
analysis is deemed high, an individual may not make the decision analysis every time, but once 
or infrequently and refer back to that result in subsequent situations (except in the event of 
substantial changes). For example, an individual may refrain from making a new decision 
analysis, referring back to a previous decision outcome even if they cannot remember the exact 
details or why they ended up with that result. 
These experiments by Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) proved that there are other factors 
influencing results in the absence of transaction costs or uncertainty. Samuelson and Zeckhauser 
(1988) conclude that unless participants were themselves adding these factors into the decisions 
in the experiment, then the rational decision choice cannot explain the status quo effects 
observed.  
2) Loss aversion can play a key role in determining that individuals remain with the status quo. 
If the individual takes the status quo as the reference point then the potential losses from 
switching loom larger than the potential gains. As a result, the findings of status quo bias run in 
parallel to those of loss aversion. However, there is a key difference between the status quo bias 
and loss aversion. Through a series of experiments Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1998) show 
how the status quo bias exists in the absence of any explicit gain or loss framing effects, for 
example with car colour. The participants were asked to imagine they have put themselves on a 
waiting list for a car that is in high demand. As a result, they have decided to accept any colour 
the car comes in. They are told that a car has arrived in a certain colour however once arriving 
they are told that cars in other colours have also just arrived, however despite new options 
available, they still stick with the original colour. They conclude that the status quo bias is, 
although consistent with loss aversion, not solely prompted by it. 
3) Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) highlight several other factors influencing the status quo 
bias, including sunk costs, regret avoidance (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982), drive for 
consistency and control. However as none of these are deemed to have significant role for this 
thesis, they are not discussed here. In summary, the status quo bias is pervasive and deviates 
from the theories of rational choice. Although parallel to loss aversion, there are several factors 
including, transaction costs, cost of information processing and phycological commitments to 
previous choices that induce a status quo bias in the absence of loss aversion.  
2.2 BE policy implications 
Although the potential use of behavioural phycology in economic decision making isn’t a new 
concept (Simon, 1959), governments and institutions have recently become increasingly 
interested in the use behavioural economics in policy. The UK was the first country to formally 
recognise the role behavioural economics in policy through the establishment of the Behavioural 
Insights Team (BIT). Since its establishment in 2010, the BIT has led to significant 
improvements in employment, healthcare, energy conservation and other areas (Halpern, 2015). 
The BIT have identified interventions which are estimated to save at least £300m, resulting in 
savings of around 22 times the cost of the BIT (UK Government, 2012). Behavioural economics 
has also been of interest to the UK energy market regulator OFGEM (OFGEM, 2011) and used 
to justify new energy policy (OFGEM, 2013). The BIT has been seen as a model for other 
countries including the US, which in 2014 launched the Social and Behavioural Sciences Team. 
In 2015 President Obama formally accepted BE by signing the Executive Order ‘Using 
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Behavioural Science Insights to Better Serve the American People’18. The executive order 
encouraged executive departments and agencies to identify where behavioural science can be 
most effective in improving public welfare and develop strategies to apply those insights into 
programs. Other notable behavioural policy units include Australia’s Behavioural Insights Unit19 
and Denmark’s Mind Lab20.  
According to Whitehead et al. (2013), 136 countries have used behavioural sciences in some 
part of public policy, with 51 having developed policy initiatives directly influenced by the new 
behavioural sciences. Furthermore, behavioural insights in public policy has been of interest to 
the EU (European Commission, 2010; 2012) and major organisations such as the OECD 
(OECD, 2017a; 2017b). This increase of behavioural informed initiatives has produced what 
some refer to as ‘the rise of the phycological state’ (Jones et al., 2013).  
Nudging, choice architecture and the default 
Nudging is one of the key concepts in behavioural science21. The concept of a nudge comes 
from the seminal book by Thaler and Sunstein (2008). Although the exact definition of a nudge 
is debated (Hansen, 2016)22, Thaler and Sunstein (2008, p. 6) define a nudge in this context as; 
“any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behaviour in a predictable way without forbidding any 
options or significantly changing their economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be 
easy and cheap to avoid. Nudges are not mandates. Putting the fruit at eye level counts as a nudge. Banning 
junk food does not.”. 
Thus, a nudge can be any element of the environment in which decisions are made that 
influences peoples choices, without restricting options (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). The 
definition also defined the term ‘choice architecture’, where the choice architect has the 
“responsibility for organizing the context in which people make decisions” (2008, pp. 3). Thaler and Sunstein 
use of the fictional example of Carolyn, a cafeteria director at a local school. She has the 
responsibility of arranging how food options are displayed. Carolyn also knows that how the 
food is displayed, either randomly or intentionally, can be a usefully tool to either maximise 
profits or increase healthy choices. Carolyn and other choice architects set the background 
conditions against which people make their choices. Sunstein (2015a) argues that such choice 
architecture is inevitable and cannot be avoided. Therefor choice architects can use nudges to 
promote behaviour that is personally or socially desirable. 
 
 
                                                 
18 Executive Order -- Using Behavioral Science Insights to Better Serve the American People (2015) 
19 http://bi.dpc.nsw.gov.au/ 
20 http://mind-lab.dk/en/ 
21 Behavioural economics and nudges are not the same, one is a scientific principle the other a way to apply its principles to 
policy (Lunn, 2014). 
22 Hansen (2016) provides an ulterior definition “A nudge is a function of (I) any attempt at influencing people’s judgment, choice or behaviour 
in a predictable way (1) that is made possible because of cognitive boundaries, biases, routines and habits in individual and social decision-making 
posing barriers for people to perform rationally in their own declared self-interests and which (2) works by making use of those boundaries, biases, 
routines, and habits as integral parts of such attempts” (p. 4). 
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As a result, a green nudge can be defined as a nudge that gently promotes environmental 
behaviour, with Schubert (2017) differentiating the following 3 types of green nudge; 
1. “Green nudges that capitalize on consumers' desire to maintain an attractive self-image through ‘green’ 
behaviour, by either simplifying product information or by making certain product characteristics more 
salient 
2. Green nudges that exploit people's inclination to ‘follow the herd’, i.e. to imitate the behaviour of their 
peers; this can be done, e.g., by conveying certain social norms through peer comparison. It can also be 
done by stimulating social status competition through, e.g., encouraging consumers to signal green 
behaviour to others. 
3. Green nudges that exploit the behavioural effects of purposefully set defaults that stipulate what happens 
if people don't actively choose” (p. 331). 
 
As highlighted above, the default setting is one example of a nudge that exploits the behavioural 
effects previously discussed. Brown and Krishna (2004) define a default as “the alternative the 
consumer receives if he/she does not explicitly request otherwise” (p. 530). Therefore, green energy defaults 
refer to where the automatic energy tariff provided to the consumer is supplied from a greater 
share of renewable energy than the other available alternatives. The default is a useful tool of 
the choice architect (Thaler 1980; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) as despite not limiting a consumer’s 
choices, the default has been found to have a large effect, in some cases even greater the than 
financial incentives (Chetty et al., 2012).  
Why defaults work 
The BE concepts and theories discussed previously in section 2.1 all contribute to the default 
effect; 
Satisficing behaviour by consumers may lead to defaults being used as heuristics to reduce the 
cognitive effort in decision making (Johnsen et al., 2002). If the default is presented to the 
consumer prior to other choices, and if it matches or exceeds the values the consumer is 
searching for, then the consumer will not search for other alternatives and stick with the default.  
The default rule is key to loss aversion as the default is seen as the reference point, thus the default 
determines what is a gain and what is a loss. As a result, although the actual financial value is 
the same, the loss occurred by switching from standard to green energy (paying more) outweighs 
the gains of switching from green to standard (paying less). Therefore, those individuals whose 
feeling/value/utility is within the values of the difference are the ones most affected by the 
default rule for loss aversion.  
The endowment effect has significant relevance to the effects of defaults. The endowment effect is 
closely related as the default is what the individual is endowed with, and as shown can occur 
instantaneously (Dinner et al., 2011). Although most commonly associated with goods, the 
endowment effect can be applied to the provision of services, such as green energy defaults 
(Pichert and Katsikopoulos, 2008). As a result, an individual will value the default more than 
other alternatives, making it more likely to remain with the default option.  
The status quo bias can have a significant effect on the power of defaults. Decision makers may 
stick to the default or even defer making the decision entirely (inertia). This is especially true if 
the decision is technical, difficult or morally charged (Sunstein & Reisch, 2013). As a green 
energy decision can be seen as complex, involving trade-offs between environmental and 
economic goods, decision makers may instead defer such decision making and decide to stick 
with the status quo. Indeed the status quo bias has been found to have a significant effect in 
consumer valuation of electricity services (Hartman et al., 1991; Brennan, 2007). 
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However, the default effect is also influenced by several other factors, including endorsement, 
social norms and guilt. A brief overview and their relevance to the default will be discussed 
below. 
Endorsement  
Decision makers may stick with the default if they infer that the default was selected by the 
choice architect for a good reason (unless in possession with information supporting an 
alternative). The consumer therefore sees the default as an implicit recommendation from the 
choice architect (Sunstein & Reisch, 2013). McKenzie et al. (2006) showed through a number 
of experiments regarding organ donation and retirement plans, that individuals perceived the 
default as the implicit recommendation of the policy maker. Furthermore, they show that the 
implicit recommendation of the default had an effect on the decision of individuals. In a study 
into retirement plans, Brown et al. (2011) found that 20% of individuals stuck with the default, 
as they perceived it to be an endorsement from their employer. Furthermore, they found a 
significant positive correlation between those defaulting due to perceived endorsement and 
those who defaulted because of the decision being too complex. As a result, a combination of 
the endorsement effect and decision complexity could increase the strength of the default. 
Tannebaum and Ditto (2012) found similar results, showing that individuals are more likely to 
perceive endorsement when the default is an automatic enrolment default. When the default is 
a non-enrolment, an individual is less likely to perceive that it was chosen for a specific reason. 
As highlighted, implicit endorsement can be both identified by consumers and found to 
influence their behaviour. A key contributing factor to the influence of implicit endorsement by 
the default  is the level of trust the individual has for the choice architect. If the consumer has 
low levels of trust in the choice architect, then this can reduce the default and even cause 
backlash (more on this in 2.3.4 Reactance). 
Social Norms 
Thaler and Sunstein (2003) propose that individuals could interpret that the option chosen as 
the default has been selected because it is the most common choice. This is backed up by Everett 
et al. (2015), who found that the default choice was perceived by individuals as the socially 
normative option23. There have been a number of studies examining the role of social norms in 
pro-environmental behaviour. Nolan et al. (2008) found that normative social influence led to 
increased energy conservation more than standard information campaigns, such as financial 
savings, environmental benefits or social responsibility. This was despite participants identifying 
the descriptive norm as having the least impact. These results are similar to Goldenstein et al. 
(2007) who found that the participation of guests in a hotel’s linen-reuse programme was greater 
with descriptive norms than environmental or social responsibility appeals. The impact of social 
norms was also examined by Alcott (2011) who found that when the electricity use of 
neighbours was provided for comparison, energy consumption was reduced by 2%. Schultz et 
al. (2007) found a similar effect with high energy users, but also a boomerang effect with low 
energy users. However, they found that injunctive norms eliminated this boomerang effect. 
Injunctive norms specify what should be done, as opposed to what is done, through morally 
approved and disapproved social conduct (Cialdini et al., 1990). Costa and Kahn (2010) show 
that the boomerang effect can depend on political ideologies, with low energy conservatives 
more likely to increase their consumption if informed that they are lower than their neighbours, 
while political liberals decrease their consumption. Cialdini (2003) highlights how negative social 
norms (i.e. informing how many others are undertaking socially unacceptable behaviour) can 
                                                 
23 Cialdini and Trost (1998) define social norms as “rules and standards that are understood by members of a group, and that guide and/or 
constrain social behaviour without the force of laws” (p. 152). 
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cause this boomerang effect, and as such descriptive norms need to be accompanied with 
injunctive norms.  
Guilt 
Guilt can be a motivator of pro-environmental behaviour through the anticipated negative effect 
motivating individuals to act in line with their subjective norms (theory of planned behaviour 
(Ajzen, 1991)) or personal norms (Norm Activation Model (Schwartz, 1977)). 
The theory of planned behaviour (TPB) states there are three independent determinants of 
intention (Ajzen, 1991). These are the attitude toward the specific behaviour (how favourable 
or unfavourable the evaluation or appraisal of the behaviour is), subjective norms (the perceived 
social pressure to either perform or not to perform the behaviour) and the degree of perceived 
behavioural control (the perceived level of ease or difficulty of performing the behaviour based 
on past experiences and anticipated obstacles). In most cases, an individual is more likely to 
perform a behaviour when the attitude and subject norm are more favourable and there is 
greater perceived behavioural control. However, the relative importance of each determinant 
varies depending on situations and behaviours. Therefore, as Ajzen states “in some applications it 
may be found that only attitudes have a significant impact on intentions, in others that attitudes and perceived 
behavioural control are sufficient to account for intentions, and in still others that all three predictors make 
independent contributions” (p. 188). Using the TPB, studies have found that moral attitude and 
subjective norms influence pro-environmental behaviour for organic food purchase (Arvola et 
al., 2008) and engagement in environmental activism (Fielding et al., 2008), however the moral 
norm was not found for recycling (Tonglet et al., 2004), while moral attitude, and not subjective 
norms, was found to influence energy conservation behaviour (Macovei, 2015).  
The Norm Activation Model (NAM) developed by Schwartz (1997) explains both altruistic and 
pro-environmental behaviour. The theoretical model explains why individuals often fail to act. 
NAM is based on two determinates of personal norms a) the awareness of the consequences of 
performing (or not performing) the activity and b) is the responsibility felt by performing the 
behaviour. Thus, violation of an individual’s own personal norms can invoke negative emotions 
such as guilt. However, as Thøgersen (2006) state, personal norms cannot be represented as 
guilt alone. The anticipated guilt and negative moral emotions can cause individuals to act in 
line with pro-environmental personal norms (Mallet, 2012; Onwezen et al., 2013, Rees & 
Bamberg, 2014; Rees et al., 2015). However, using guilt in environmental issues can backfire 
and that framing around moral emotions can evoke a defensive emotional focus and avoidance 
of the topic (Täuber & Van Zomeren, 2013). As a result, for those who recognise the need to 
undertake pro-environmental behaviour, guilt can be a significant motivator. However, for 
those individuals that have not accepted responsibility for environmental actions, Bedford et al. 
(2011) argue that the motivations should be more extrinsic, such as shame or financial penalties.  
With regards to green default studies, Theotokis and Manganari (2014) showed that increased 
anticipated guilt in opt-out policies resulted in a higher enrolment than with opt-in. In their first 
study, participants were faced with an opt-in and opt-out policy for towel reuse in a hypothetical 
hotel. In the opt-in condition, they had to leave a card informing the hotel not to replace their 
towels that day. In the opt-out, they had to leave a card informing the hotel to replace their 
towels that day (instead of every three days). They found that the likelihood of reusing towels 
was influenced by both the default policy, with the opt-out condition producing a higher 
participation rate than the opt-in. Furthermore, they found that higher environmental 
consciousness of the participant the greater the likelihood of participation in the program. 
Finally, they showed that defaults had more effect with those with lower environmental 
consciousness. In their second study, they test their hypothesis that active choosing will lead to 
increased enrolment in electronic bank statements, as consumers need to think in order to make 
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such a decision which could augment perceived accountability and therefore anticipated guilt. 
However, their results only partially support this, as although active choice resulted in the 
highest enrolment, the difference was only significantly greater than the opt-in policy. Hedlin 
and Sunstein (2016) suggest that the reason the results were not significant was due to the small 
sample size of only 107 students split into three conditions. In a third study into e-billing, 
Theotokis and Manganari (2014) find similar results, with both the opt-out and active choice 
significantly greater likelihood of participation with no difference between active choice and 
opt-in. 
Hedlin and Sunstein (2016) have also investigated the role of guilt in green defaults, specifically 
for green energy defaults. They found that although the increased level of guilt between active 
choice and standard default was only marginally significant (p<0.1), there was a significantly 
greater level of guilt experienced in the active choice setting than the green default. Secondly, 
they found a large and significant positive relationship between the average level of guilt and 
enrolment in a green energy programme. However, they state that guilt cannot be only 
contributing factor as even though there was less guilt in the green default it still produced 
higher enrolment than the standard default. Finally, they find that, as expected, there is less guilt 
in not enrolling in green energy when it costs more, than when both a) no information is 
provided on the cost or quality differences and b) when the costs and quality are the same. 
2.3 Review of literature  
Green energy defaults 
Pichert and Katsikopoulos (2008) were the first to study how green energy defaults influenced 
enrolment in green energy programs. Targeting a sample of younger adults (between 18-35 with 
a mean age of 25), 225 participants were asked to imagine they had relocated to a new town and 
had to choose a new electricity provider, either a green or standard energy supplier. The green 
supplier was more expensive than the standard energy supplier (€30 v €25/month). Participants 
were randomly assigned one of three groups, a green default (opt-out), standard default (opt-in) 
and a neutral (active choice). Their results showed that 68% of participants stuck with the green 
contract when presented as the default (opt-out), compared to only 41% in the opt-in and 67% 
in the active choice (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008). Statistical analysis revealed that both the 
green and neutral were statistically different from the standard default treatment, but no 
difference between the green and neutral treatments was found. 
Vetter and Kutzner (2016) replicated closely the survey experiment by Pichert and 
Katsikopoulos (2008). Their results showed that the green default treatment substantially and 
significantly increased the choice of green electricity by over 4 times. Their study expanded on 
Pichert and Katsikopoulos’s original design to test whether there was a relationship between the 
environmental attitude of the respondent and choice of electricity, however their results found 
no significant relationship. 
Hedlin and Sunstein (2015) conducted an online survey of 1,037 respondents (average age was 
33 (range 18-71), 61% male and a median household income of $25,000-$50,000). The 
respondents were randomly assigned one of nine groups based on a 3x3 design. The design 
combined a policy of either a green energy default, standard energy default or active choice, 
with either a more expensive green energy ($25/month), no information regarding price or 
quality, or information stating the price and quality is identical. The results showed that when 
combining all nine groups, 82% chose green energy in the active choice, 76% in the green default 
and 69% in the standard energy default. However, for the scenario where the extra cost was 
stated, these figures dropped to 56% actively choosing, 39% green default and 26% standard 
default. 
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Ebeling and Lotz (2015) carried out a randomized controlled trial (RCT) of 41,952 German 
households in a 4.5 week long trial. The RCT was embedded into a nationwide energy suppliers’ 
web page and targeted prospective customers of that company. The participants were randomly 
assigned one of two treatments. In the control treatment, respondents were asked to choose 
between two contracts with differing service quality and costs. In both contracts there was an 
additional option for 100% green energy, which was unselected (opt-in). In the experimental 
condition, the same choices and price were presented, however the box for 100% green energy 
was defaulted as pre-selected (opt-out). In both cases the renewable energy was slightly more 
expensive at 0.3 EUR cents per unit (representing a premium of 1.4% and 1.3% depending on 
service contract). Their results showed a large and significant effect from the default option. Of 
those that that purchased a contract, only 7.2% purchased a green contract in the opt-in, while 
that number rose to 69.2% for the opt-out treatment. To check whether individuals realised 
they were choosing green energy they carried out a supplementary experiment. In this awareness 
check they found that (n=168) in the opt-in treatment 100% were able to recall that they chose 
green energy, while in the opt-out 84.13% were unaware of making the decision. 
Lastly, Momsen and Stoerk (2014) conducted a study where they asked respondents to imagine 
they have just moved to a new flat in a new neighbourhood. After being given some hypothetical 
information regarding their income and expenditures, they are told that there are two energy 
contracts available to them; a 100% conventional energy contract at €30/month, and a 50% 
renewable/50% conventional energy contract at 45€/month. In a default group, respondents 
were told that if they do not make an active choice they would keep the contract using 50% 
renewable energy, while in the control group participants had to make an active choice. Results 
showed that the green default led to an 44.6% increase in renewable energy uptake (control of 
48.2% (n=33) compared to the green default of 69.7% (n=85)).  
Other green defaults 
Araña and León (2013) conducted a field experiment into the role of defaults in carbon 
offsetting programs. 1,680 participants were randomly allocated one of two treatments, an opt-
in treatment where individuals were asked if they would be willing to pay extra for carbon 
offsetting, and an opt-out where individuals were asked if they would like to deduct the carbon 
offset fee. The fee was randomly generated for each participant (either 10, 20, 40 or 60 euros). 
Results showed that as the fee increases, the number of those who accepted to pay decreases 
for both treatments. Furthermore, they found that overall 45% chose to pay extra in the opt-in 
and 57% in the opt out (p=0.017). The results were significantly different for the 10 and 20 euro 
bids but not the larger 40 and 60 euro bids. The mean WTP was 31.29€ for opt-out and 25.5€ 
for the opt-in. 
Löfgren et al. (2012) conducted a field experiment with 240 environmental economists to 
investigate the robustness of the default effect. The participants were split randomly into 3 
groups relating to carbon offsetting. The option whether to offset was preselected for the two 
defaults (either opt-in or opt-out) and not for the active choice. Results showed that the active 
choice had the highest level of participation (46.8%) followed by the default to offset (43.2%) 
and lastly the default not to offset (39.3%). However statistical analysis revealed that there was 
no difference between the treatments. They conclude that the greater environmental awareness 
within the sample reduces the impact of the default. Their results back up other studies (List, 
2003) and conclude that policy makers should focus on inexperienced individuals when 
determining the default policy as those are likely to be the most affected. 
The effects of defaults have also been tested for energy efficiency. In a RCT, Brown et al. (2013) 
manipulated the default setting of thermosets in OECD offices over a six-week period in winter. 
They found that a 1°C decrease in the default temperature setting resulted in a reduction of the 
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chosen temperature setting by an average of 0.38 (of which occupant behaviour contributed 
65%). Furthermore, they found that the reduction of 1°C led to a greater reduction in chosen 
settings than a 2°C default setting the temperature. Individuals actively respond and overrode 
the default effects more often under the 2°C default setting. Although not able to test the 
reasons behind such behaviour, they provide three hypotheses. First that individuals did not 
recognise small temperature difference associated with 1°C but did with 2°C. Second, they did 
perceive temperature differences in both cases, but the cognitive and physical effort outweighed 
their perceived gains of just 1°C. Finally, the slight reduction expanded the comfort preferences, 
reshaping their preferences, which they recognised but were happy with it. The authors also 
highlight the potential ethical implications of the last hypothesis.  
Egebark and Ekström (2016) conducted a natural field experiment to test the effects of a moral 
appeal message and a default setting to encourage double sided printing. They found that the 
moral appeal had no impact, however the default setting resulted in a 15% reduction in paper 
use. Furthermore, they collected over six months after the change which showed the same 
levels, indicating that the behaviour influenced by the default was long-term. Lastly, they report 
that demand for printing was unchanged throughout the experimental period. 
Toft et al. (2014) investigated whether defaults are an effective policy tool for participation in 
SmartGrids. They conducted an online experiment with electricity consumers from Denmark, 
Norway and Switzerland (n=3802). The participants were randomly allocated one of three 
conditions, two defaults and one active choice treatments. The default manipulation was framed 
as tick boxes, where the participant had to the tick the box if they wanted to opt-in “YES, I 
would like to have a smart meter with remote control installed in my home” or opt-out where they would 
have to tick the box “NO, I would not like to have a smart meter with remote control installed in my home” 
(p. 117). In the active choice treatment, the participants had to choose one of the alternatives. 
Their results found that both the opt-out and active choice were most effective in participation 
rates. They state that “the standard opt-in framing makes inaction the default and many people procrastinate 
because they are not motivated to invest the mental effort needed to make the decision. This means that many 
people refrain from signing up even if this would be in their own best interest.” (p. 121). The theoretical 
assumptions provided by Toft et al. claims that both the active choice and opt-out treatments 
result in greater cognitive effort invested in making the decision. In the active choice treatment 
consumers are forced to make a choice, and in the opt-out consumers recognise that something 
will change if they don’t make a decision, thus triggers more cognitive effort by the consumer. 
As a result, decisions under such situations are more likely to reveal the real preferences. When 
less cognitive effort is required the participants are more likely to make a random choice. 
Along with studies into the role of green defaults, it is important to highlight arguably the most 
well-known example of the effect of defaults, that of organ donation24. Johnson and Goldstein 
(2003) conducted an online experiment in which 161 respondents were put into three treatment 
groups, an opt-in, opt-out and neutral condition. Results showed that 82% consented to be 
organ donors in the opt-out setting and 79% in the neutral (not significantly different). These 
were almost twice as high as the opt-in condition, with only 42%. 
 
                                                 
24 Arguably second most cited on defaults is retirement saving plans (Madrian &Shea,2001), which found significant participant 
under automatic enrolment. Similar findings have been backed up by Choi et al. (2003;2004) and Beshears et al. (2005). 
Defaults have also been found to produce significant effects in other areas, such as increasing charitable donations (Goswami 
& Urminsky, 2016), receiving vaccinations (Keller et al, 2011), healthier food choices (Downs, et al, 2009), future 
correspondence with websites (Johnson et al, 2002) and choice of add-on features when buying a car (Park et al, 2000). 
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2.4 Ethical considerations 
There is a growing debate regarding the ethics of nudging in public policy. This is a complex 
subject and whole theses could easily be devoted to it (and have been). As such only the key 
arguments relevant to this thesis are discussed, albeit briefly.  
As stated previously, nudging can be defined as “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s 
behaviour in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives” 
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 6). Thaler and Sunstein (2003) therefore advocate nudging as what 
they describe as a form of ‘libertarian paternalism’. Whereby libertarian refers to liberty-
preserving, so that the individual’s freedom of choice is not reduced, and paternalism refers to 
it being legitimate for the choice architects to attempt to improve people’s lives by influencing 
their behaviour (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). These are therefore self-conscious actions taken by 
private or public institutions, that attempt to make people’s lives better off as judged by the 
choice architect. Cass Sunstein’s 2014 book ‘Why Nudge the Politics of Libertarian Paternalism’, 
refers to hard paternalism as “actions of government that attempt to improve people’s welfare by imposing 
material costs on their choices” while soft paternalism they refer to as “actions of government that attempt 
to improve people’s welfare by influencing their choices without imposing material costs on those choices” (p. 58). 
As a result, nudges can be seen as a form of soft paternalism as advocated by Thaler and 
Sunstein.  
However, several authors have argued against libertarian paternalism as defined by Thaler and 
Sunstein (Goodwin, 2012; McCrudden & King, 2015; Hausman & Welch, 2010). Mitchel (2005), 
presents three main arguments against such paternalism. Firstly, that paternalism is not 
inevitable all situations. Secondly, that libertarian paternalism fails to justify the choice of putting 
welfare over liberty. And finally, there is a disregard of the potential redistributive effects which 
libertarian paternalism can produce. Mitchell (2005) therefore claims that libertarian paternalism 
is an oxymoron and offers nothing different to conventional paternalism. However, are such 
discussions surrounding paternalism relevant in the study of green nudges, aimed at promoting 
pro-environmental behaviour? Thaler and Sunstein’s definition of paternalism refers to that it 
being legitimate for the choice architects to attempt to improve people’s lives by influencing 
their behaviour (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p5). Thus paternalism in the philosophical sense as 
used by Thaler and Sunstein, refers to protecting the individual from harm. However as 
Schubert (2017) argues, the aim of a green nudge is not to increase the welfare of the individual 
(paternalistic) but increase social welfare (non-paternalistic). Therefore the use of paternalism, 
as advocated by Thaler and Sunstein would infer that green nudges should only be used when 
green nudges also improve the lives of the individual. As this is not the case for all green nudges, 
and difficult to prove, there is a danger of using the definition that, that nudges should ‘improve 
the lives’. In the sense of green nudges, paternalism should more reflect the preferences and 
satisfaction of individual welfare25.  
Autonomy  
A key ethical consideration of nudges involves the libertarian concept and autonomy. Thaler 
and Sunstein’s claim that libertarian paternalism (LP) is liberty-preserving has been challenged 
by other authors (Grüne-Yanoff, 2012). Grüne-Yanoff (2012) argues that LP violates the core 
liberal principals as it both limits freedom, and that the justification of LP as a trade-off between 
liberty and human welfare, is not compatible with liberal principals as LP respects neither the 
subjectivity or the plurality of human values.  
                                                 
25 This is more in line with Dworkin’s (1972) definition of paternalism "interference with a person's liberty of action justified 
by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or value” (p. 65). 
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When examining the autonomy of defaults specifically, Smith et al. (2013) state “under defaults,  
the consumer  generally  cedes  some independence   of   choice   to   the   marketer,   and   consumer autonomy  
is diminished” (p. 163). If the forces of the default effect are seen as hidden persuaders that are 
inconsistent with consumers ability to exercise their choice, this has resulting implications on 
the consumer's sovereignty to make their own decisions. Autonomy is reduced when the reasons 
for the default effect are due to the cognitive bias of the individual and in situations where 
individuals do not perceive the default as a choice (costs of switching are too high). However, 
Smith et al. state that autonomy is maintained when the effect of the default is due to effort or 
when it is due to a correct assumption of an endorsement by the choice architect. This is because 
in such cases the individual is acting in line with preferences regarding ease and convenience of 
decision making or intentionally defer to the judgement of the choice architect. Evans et al. 
(2017) conclude similar findings with green defaults, in that they do impede, in some degree, on 
consumer autonomy due to the external forces of the default effects which distort the ability of 
the individual’s decision-making process based on their own motivations and values. 
Sunstein (2015a) states that active choice is often superior over defaults as the best choice 
architecture to preserve autonomy. Preserving freedom of choice alone is not enough to prevent 
default rules infringing on autonomy, especially if the likely choices are not tracked. Sunstein 
highlights that if the forces behind the default effect (e.g. inertia) are powerful enough, 
individuals might not reject potentially harmful defaults. As a result, individuals may end up 
with outcomes they did not specifically select, intruding on their autonomy. However, Sunstein 
also states that in some situations the default is superior to active choice for protecting 
autonomy, as “if people choose not to choose, or if they would  make that choice if asked, it is an insult to their 
autonomy to force them  to choose” (Sunstein, 2015a, p. 30). 
Manipulation 
Manipulation is one of the biggest ethical concerns with nudges (White, 2013). Sunstein (2015a) 
defends such criticism by saying that an effort to merely altering one’s behaviour is not 
manipulation in itself. However the debate regarding the potential for nudges to manipulate 
choices is complex and most of it stems from differing definitions of manipulation (Wilkinson, 
2012). This led Hansen and Jespersen (2013) to develop a framework to outline the 
manipulation of different nudges. In the framework, they categorise nudges into transparent or 
non-transparent, as well as Type 1 or Type 2. They provide the following definitions; 
Both types of nudges aim at influencing automatic modes of thinking. But while type 2 nudges are aimed 
at influencing the attention and premises of – and hence the behaviour anchored in – reflective thinking (i.e. 
choices), via influencing the automatic system, type 1 nudges are aimed at influencing the behaviour maintained 
by automatic thinking, or consequences thereof without involving reflective thinking (p14). 
“A transparent nudge is defined as a nudge provided in such a way that the intention behind it, as well 
as the means by which behavioural change is pursued, could reasonably be expected to be transparent to the agent 
being judged as a result of the intervention” (p.17)  while a “non-transparent nudge, on the other hand, will be 
defined as a nudge working in a way that the citizen in the situation cannot reconstruct either the intention or the 
means by which behavioural change is pursued.” (p. 18) 
As a result, Hansen and Jespersen (2013) identify that green defaults can be either transparent 
type 1 or non-transparent type 1. For transparent type 1, they give the example of changing the 
default settings of a printer as an example and are more ethically defensible. The changing of 
the background defaults (opt-in or opt-out) constitutes a type 1 non-transparent nudge. Thus, 
green energy defaults have the potential to manipulate behaviour, not choice. As they are non-
transparent to the individual, they apply both technical and psychological manipulation, 
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intending to alter behaviour26. Therefore, they conclude that for such defaults that not only the 
‘ends’ for which the default is used is carefully calibrated to the best interests of the individuals, 
but that also the intentions and the ‘means’ of the default are actively disclosed. This would then 
clarify that the responsibility of the default effects and potential side effects are those of the 
choice architect, not the consumer.   
McCrudden and King (2015) state that Sunstein fails to acknowledge how manipulative nudging 
can be if not designed with the level of care that he advocates. They make several arguments to 
support their claim. The first is the presumption in favour of nudging as being the default 
strategy is unjustified. McCrudden and King see nudging as less successful than mandates 
(which rarely offend personal autonomy) and that the reliance in nudging on the cognitive 
failures offends human dignity more than bans or mandates (which rarely offend personal 
autonomy). Secondly, the lack of acknowledgement of the potential manipulatory power of 
nudging if not designed with due care is not addressed. Furthermore, due to the previous 
arguments, nudging might be subject to legal challenges, resulting in a weak regulatory 
intervention likely to be challenged by powerful interest groups. As such, those in favour of the 
outcomes of nudges should instead pursue regulatory approaches, which they claim is more 
transparent, effective and democratic. 
Transparency 
As mentioned transparency is a key factor in the ethical concerns over potential manipulation. 
Boven (2009) assesses the moral ethics of Thalers and Sunstein’s Nudge (2008), and concludes 
that nudges by governments are morally acceptable when the nudge is transparent so 
manipulation can be revealed, and when it brings decisions in line with preferences. However, 
Boven highlights concerns with the use of nudges with consumers who lack strong or coherent 
preferences. In such situations the nudge works by substituting the preference and values of the 
choice architect for those of the individual. This can result in what Boven describes as 
fragmented selves, where the individual becomes unrecognisable to themselves. Fragmented 
selves can be limited if the nudge changes the individual’s preference to that of the choice 
architect, however that raises potentially greater ethical implications (fragmentation versus 
autonomy). Furthermore, Boven highlights concerns that nudging could lead to individuals’ 
incapable of acting on their preferences and self-command. Boven also suggests that more 
sustainable long-term behaviour may be better created with freer choices. Finally, if the person 
is actively choosing to put themselves in a potential situation rich with nudges (which they can 
identify) then nudging is more acceptable. Therefore, according to Boven (2009), nudges should 
both be transparent and aim to align consumers with their preferences, not the preference of 
the choice architect.   
A number of recent papers have supported nudges being transparent, by examining the effect 
of transparency on the default effect. These studies have shown that disclosing either the 
presence or purpose of the default has no difference on the effectiveness (Loewenstein et al., 
2015; Kroese et al., 2016; Steffel et al., 2016). Furthermore, the effect of transparency has been 
studied in green defaults specifically. Bruns et al. (2016) investigate the default effect in 
contributions of carbon reductions. They find that the default effect increases the contributions, 
and the additional information on the transparency (influence, purpose or both) has no 
significant effect. Finally, they find no evidence that greater transparency regarding the influence 
or purpose of the default triggers phycological reactance (discussed below). These studies have 
                                                 
26 Psychological manipulation as the “sense of  intending to change the perception, choices or behaviour of others through 
underhanded deceptive, or even  abusive  tactics” while technical as “the intentional manipulation of a straightforward cause-
and-effect relationship” (Hansen & Jespersen, 2013, p. 18) 
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been used to alleviate concerns from private actors who are worried that transparency would 
reduce the effect of a default (Goldstein et al., 2008). 
Reactance 
Not only are there ethical issues regarding autonomy and manipulation, but such factors can 
also reduce the effect of the default through reactance. Reactance theory states that “when 
individuals’ freedom is restricted or removed, psychological reactance will be activated and individuals will strive 
to restore the lost freedom” (Shen, 2014, p. 967). The result of such psychological reactance can 
increase in the attractiveness of the constrained alternative, as well as reduced level of evaluation 
in the source of the restriction (Fitzsimons & Lehmann, 2004). Despite a default rule not actually 
restricting the freedom of an individual, as the individual has free choice and the ability to opt-
in or out (hence libertarian paternalism), a perception of constraint may exist (Hedlin & 
Sunstein, 2016).    
A threat to freedom can also be a persuasive attempt to shape, change or reinforce responses 
(Miller, 2013). Brehm and Brehm (1981) state that any action that makes it more difficult for an 
individual to exercise their freedom can constitute a threat. Shen (2014) found that threats to 
freedom through strongly worded messages clearly intended to persuade, activate greater 
phycological reactance than milder messages. Furthermore, they found that the phycological 
reactance was greater when the message was framed as a loss than a gain. In the loss framing 
the messages emphasised the negative implications of non-compliance (e.g.  increased risk of 
skin cancer) while in the gain frame, highlighted the benefits of compliance (e.g. lower risk of 
skin cancer). Furthermore, reactance can occur without loss of freedom if the individual is felt 
pressured to act in a certain way (Brehm, 1966) or if the individual feels that losing freedom in 
this instance may lead to future loss of freedoms (Brehm, 1989).  
In some cases, reactance to a default setting can cause individuals act against their preferences. 
Arad and Rubenstein (2015) conducted a hypothetical study of the creation of a special savings 
account which offered high-interest rates but the money would not be available after 10 years. 
They found significant protest to governmental involvement to the extent that many chose to 
opt-out even if they would have participated without governmental involvement. When the 
individuals are told beforehand that the government is employing choice architecture to increase 
savings, then fewer individuals chose the savings arrangement. Reiter et al. (2012) found that in 
a hypothetical study for defaults in US school vaccinations, parents were more likely to consent 
to vaccination in the opt-in situation rather than the opt-out situation or the neutral condition. 
They suggest that a possible reason is that the opt-out condition could be seen as a violation of 
their parental autonomy. This could be emphasized by the controversial situation regarding 
school vaccination in the US at that time. They also find that the default conditions had no 
effect on those parents undecided.  Miller (1976) found that the exposure to excessive 
information can constitute a threat if it makes the ability to make a preferred decision more 
difficult. They suggest that phycological reactance is the likely reason for the observations.  
Hedlin and Sunstein (2016) found that active choice conditions for green electricity received 
lower approval rating than either a green or standard energy default. This appears to contradict 
the above discussion on reactance and freedom. They suggest one possible reason is in the 
framing of their question which could have been interpreted as the state government has 
cancelled their current plan and if they do not make a choice they will not receive any energy 
plan. Furthermore, when they compare the approval ratings of both default scenarios, they find 
no significant difference when the costs are the same, but a significantly lower approval rating 
with the green default when it is stated it costs extra. They note that as they found a positive 
correlation between approval rating and enrolment, and that the green default had significantly 
higher enrolment than the standard, this too appears contradictory. However, they suggest that 
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this is due to a minority who opted-out of the green default and gave the condition they lowest 
possible approval rating, which could indicate reactance. Finally, they suggest that reactance can 
reduce guilt.  
Justification of nudging 
Others have argued not over the ethics of nudging process, but over the justification of using 
nudges in the first place. Thaler and Sunstein’s (2003, 2008) justification of using nudging as a 
policy tool is based on the assertion of correcting irrational behaviour. However, Gigerenzer 
(2015) claims that as bounded rationality is not necessarily irrational, thus the use of nudges to 
counter what he sees as rational behaviour in decision making is unethical27.   
The ethical justification of the use of nudges has also been criticised in other ways. Nudges alter 
decisions people make under the justification these would be the decisions they would make if 
they were not different people (i.e. if they were not loss averse, biased towards the status quo 
and used mental shortcuts to make decisions). However White (2013) argues here in lies the 
issue, that if they were a different person to who they actually are, which White argues is no 
different to value substitution.  
Consent to be nudged 
A key ethical consideration is whether society wishes to be nudged. Johnson and Goldstein 
(2003) highlight that as most Americans favour organ donation, this gives a form of consent for 
nudging, “as noted earlier, both national surveys and the no-default condition in our experiment suggest that 
most Americans favour organ donation. This implies that explicit consent policies impose the costs of switching 
on the apparent majority” (p. 1339). 
Reisch and Sunstein (2016) found that UK participants responded favourably to nudges, 
including both encouraging and mandatory green energy defaults (Table 2). These were seen as 
more favourable than other defaults such as charity donations and carbon offsets (approval 
ratings of 25% and 46% respectively), but less than requiring grocery stores to place healthy 
foods prominently (71%). The results from European nations match those found the US, which 
showed that 75% favoured automatic enrolment into green energy programmes, however 
approval varied with political party preferences (Sunstein, 2015b).  
Table 2 Approval rating of green energy defaults by country 
Country Encouraging green energy (%) Mandatory green energy (%) 
UK 65 65 
Italy 76 74 
France 61 57 
Germany 69 67 
Hungary 72 65 
Denmark 36 55 
Source: Reisch and Sunstein (2016) 
The results from Reisch and Sunstein (2016) show that there is strong support for green energy 
defaults in both the UK and other European countries. This coupled with a high WTP (see 
introduction), can provide some form of consent for green energy defaults in the UK. 
                                                 
27 Gigerenzer (2015) quotes Herbet Simon in that “Bounded rationality is not irrationality. ... On the contrary, I think there is 
plenty of evidence that people are generally quite rational; that is, they usually have reasons for what they do” (p. 361) 
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3 Methodology 
The purpose of this section is to outline the methodological processes involved in conducting 
this research, to the extent that the survey can be replicated. The experimental design and 
reference to the design of similar experiments are initially presented. Relevant to the problem 
under analysis and applicable to policy analysis. A detailed description of the data collection 
methods is then presented as well as an analysis of the representativeness of the sample against 
the population. Finally, the methods for data analysis are explained and justified.  
 
3.1 Experimental design and treatment of participants 
The experimental design in this study considered the methodology of all published green energy 
default studies (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008; Momsen & Stoerk, 2014; Ebeling & Lotz, 2015; 
Hedlin & Sunstein, 2015; Vetter & Kutzner, 2016), as well as other non-energy green default 
studies. However, the design more closely follows that of Pichert and Katsikopoulos, (2008). 
This is the most well known of all green energy default studies and the survey design by has 
been replicated by other studies (Vetter & Kutzner, 2016). This was done in order to ensure 
methodological consistency with the existing research as well as allowing the results to be 
compared with others. The majority of green default studies randomly assign participants into 
different treatment groups, usually one control and then one or two manipulation treatment. 
The majority of green default studies (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008; Hedlin & Sunstein, 2015; 
Vetter & Kutzner, 2016) frame the surveys as the default was a different energy supplier (who 
is either referred to as more environmentally friendly or sources energy from renewable 
sources). Ebeling and Lotz (2015) however present the green default not as a separate energy 
supplier, but as an additional option when choosing standard tariff to have the energy come 
from renewable sources (the default is whether the box is pre-ticked or not). 
Academic studies in choice behaviour are dominated by two main data methods: Stated 
Preference (SP) and Revealed Preference (RP). SP is a common method to obtain information 
based on a hypothetical market setting. In most SP experiments, the participants are presented 
with a number of hypothetical choices, each with a finite number of alternatives and are then 
asked to choose the one they prefer the most. RP data consists instead of choices made on the 
real market. RP data can be observational or self-reported. RP data can be either with or without 
experimental influence, with experiments often used to replace a lack of available data in a real 
market setting (Fifer et al., 2014). There are many examples as to when a participant’s revealed 
preference should also be interpreted as their normative preference. Normative preferences 
represent the participant's true interests (Beshears et al., 2008). However, Beshears et al. (2008) 
highlight various factors that can increase the disparity between revealed and normative 
preferences. Of these the passive choice/default is one such situation, whereby the acceptance 
of the default could be from a meaningful and conscious decision, or instead influenced by other 
forces (e.g. inertia). As a result, preferences regarding whether a consumer would like to have a 
green tariff can be seen as a normative preference, while whether they actually do or not is their 
revealed preference. 
This experiment itself can be categorised as a ‘laboratory experiment’, where the control and 
experimental groups are subject to exactly the same environment apart from the experimental 
intervention (de Vaus, 2001 p56). This ensures that the only feasible reason for observed 
differences is the intervention. In addition, the experiment can be further categorised as a 
randomised control trial (RCT). RCTs randomly assign participants to two or more groups, 
usually one receiving the control and the others a treatment or intervention. By measuring the 
outcomes, this allows for a quantitative, controlled and comparative experiment for one or more 
interventions under analysis. 
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The survey design itself started with an initial welcome page, which provided the title, 
information regarding anonymous responses, and a thank you message for taking part. The 
welcome page was kept brief so as not to frame the responses in any way. Colours and graphics 
were kept on the neutral default recommendation so as not to influence the responses in any 
way (for example a green background could influence answers).  
An initial screening question was applied to eliminate those not responsible for the electricity 
decisions in the households. Those eliminated did not count towards the final survey. The 
reasoning is that research has shown that the willingness to pay for renewable energy can be 
related to whether the respondent is a bill payer or not (Zarnikau, 2003; Hite et al., 2008). 
Participants were then randomly allocated one of three treatments. A hidden, random number 
generator question drew an integer number from 1 to 3, which allocated participants 
automatically to one of three treatments. At the beginning of each treatment, the participants 
were asked to take their time and to answer as if they would in a real-life situation. This was to 
reduce (to the possible extent) the potential for hypothetical bias. In all three treatments 
participants were asked to imagine they had just moved to a new town and were informed by 
the local energy supplier of the available tariffs. The three treatments were as follows: 
a) A green energy default treatment, where a green electricity tariff was the tariff the participant 
would be put on unless instructed otherwise. 
“Please take your time to carefully read the question and respond as if you would in a real-
life setting. Assume you have moved to a new town. You receive a letter from the local electricity 
supplier of that area. They inform you that unless instructed otherwise you will be automatically 
put on their green electricity tariff, where 100% of the electricity comes from renewable sources 
(e.g. hydro, wind, solar, bioenergy). Based on average electricity use, the green tariff is expected 
to cost £2.50/month more than the standard electricity tariff (where the electricity comes from 
a mix of nuclear, fossil fuels and renewables). If you would like to switch to the standard tariff 
you are asked to notify the company. What do you do?” 
o Stay on the assigned green electricity tariff  
o Switch to the standard electricity tariff 
 
b) A standard energy default treatment, where a standard electricity tariff was the tariff the 
participant would be put on unless instructed otherwise. 
“Please take your time to carefully read the question and respond as if you would in a real-
life setting. Assume you have moved to a new town. You receive a letter from the local electricity 
supplier of that area. They inform you that unless instructed otherwise you will be automatically 
put on their standard electricity tariff (where the electricity comes from a mix of nuclear, fossil 
fuels and renewables). They also inform you about their green tariff where 100% of the 
electricity is generated from renewable sources (e.g. hydro, wind, solar, bioenergy). Based on 
average electricity use, the green tariff is expected to cost £2.50/month more than the standard 
electricity tariff. If you would like to switch to the green tariff you are asked to notify the 
company. What do you do?” 
o Stay on the assigned standard electricity tariff  
o Switch to the green electricity tariff 
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c) An active choice treatment, where a choice had to be made between the two tariffs without 
either being provided as a default. 
 “Please take your time to carefully read the question and respond as if you would in a 
real-life setting. Assume you have moved to a new town. You are informed by the local 
electricity provider of the available tariffs. These are a standard electricity tariff (where the 
electricity comes from a mix of nuclear, fossil fuels and renewables) and a green electricity tariff 
(where the electricity comes from 100% renewable sources, e.g. hydro, wind, solar, bioenergy). 
Based on average electricity use, the green tariff is expected to cost £2.50/month more than the 
standard electricity tariff. You are asked to make an active choice, which do you choose?” 
o Green electricity tariff  
o Standard electricity tariff 
 
The definition of a standard energy tariff was given to avoid confusion, as a standard tariff in a 
UK context can also refer to the pricing structure (OFGEM, 2013). However exact details of 
the contribution of each source in the energy mix was not given as this would be unlikely to 
happen in a real market setting. Furthermore, the exact mix of renewables would only be an 
approximation, and this could influence results as a number of studies have shown that WTP 
for renewable energy is affected by the type of RE (Borchers et al., 2007; Garcia et al., 2012; 
Kosenius & Ollikainen, 2013; Navrud & Bråten, 2007). 
Participants were then asked whether their actual tariff was a standard or green electricity tariff. 
Participants who answered standard or did not know where asked if they would be willing to 
switch to a green electricity tariff at the same premium as the stated experiment. Participants 
who stated that they would not like to pay for a green tariff were asked for their reasons. The 
possibility for open-ended questions was not included due to practicalities with coding up to 
500 answers. Furthermore, other authors had highlighted the complexity of this approach 
(Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008). As a result, eight closed answer categories were provided. 
These questions were chosen based on the most common answers in previous literature and the 
key theories of behavioural economics. Although 12 possible answers were identified from 
literature, eight were deemed as the most likely for the UK context. The option of an “other” 
response with the possibility to add text was included. It is acknowledged that the pre-selection 
of answer options has limitations, this is discussed more in the methodological issues chapter. 
Participants were given the option to select multiple reasons.  
• Unwilling to spend any more on electricity than currently am  
• Effort and time switching  
• Content enough with my current tariff  
• Not enough information given on green tariffs  
• Do not see the need for a green tariff  
• Environmental benefits do not justify the costs  
• Mitigating climate change is not my responsibility  
• Do not know anyone else with a green tariff  
• Other: ______________ 
The wording of the treatments was created to reflect what would occur on a real market, 
however attention was given to not be so specific that the design reduces the external validity 
of the results to other settings with similar energy markets. Several OFGEM proposals on 
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default renewal notice were used, these included that the supplier should not encourage the 
consumer to choose one particular tariff, to clearly explain what happens in the default 
treatment if the consumer does nothing, and a personal projection of the default and switching 
cost comparisons (OFGEM, 2013). 
A key factor of this study was to replicate a real-world pricing premium for green electricity in 
a UK context. However, as previously mentioned none of the large incumbent suppliers 
currently offer green tariffs. Therefore, in order to provide a realistic premium in the event of 
the reintroduction of green tariffs, information was sourced from historic tariff data, personal 
communication with energy companies, and relevant published studies (Table 3). Based on 
these, a price premium of 5% was selected, relating to a current price premium of around 
£2.50/month based on average electricity bills in Scotland in 2016. Monthly price was chosen 
as the most realistic to how bills are charged in Scotland. Although data for the current rates of 
green tariffs offered by smaller specialist suppliers is available, this was not used. The principal 
reason for this is that this study focuses on the potential reintroduction of green tariffs by 
incumbent suppliers as the default (the rates offered by the incumbent suppliers were in most 
cases significantly lower than the specialist suppliers (Graham, 2006)). 
Table 3 UK studies on the premiums for green electricity tariffs 
Authors Finding 
Hast et al. (2014) Premium of typically between 0-5%,  
Diaz-Rainey and Ashton (2008) 2.1% premium 
Graham (2007) 0-5% premium for the major energy companies, (6-12% for smaller, 
specialist green energy companies) 
Dale et al. (2004) 5% premium over conventional forms for most competitive RES, wind 
Bird et al. (2002) Premiums varied between 0-15% with the majority between 2-10% 
 
The final survey design was peer reviewed by a panel of energy experts and academics working 
in the field.  
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3.2 Methods for data collection 
The survey was designed and hosted on the open source online survey application LimeSurevey. 
LimeSurvey was chosen over other popular survey software programmes as it was the only 
programme identified that allowed access to the design features required whilst within the 
financial resources of this study. Results from an academic search engine revealed that 
LimeSurvey has been used extensively in research. 
Before the experiment was launched, a power analysis was conducted to ensure the sample 
would result in a power of at least 0.8 at an estimated effect size of 0.26 with a significance level 
of 0.05 (Cohen, 1988). In the absence of a pilot study, the estimated effect size is based on the 
findings from other literature on green energy defaults (Pichert and Katsikopoulos, 2008; Vetter 
and Kutzner, 2016). As there are only a few studies reporting the effect size of green electricity 
defaults, the final sample size required was increased to allow for uncertainty, resulting in a final 
sample required of 500. 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from an online panel provided by ResearchNow. Research Now is 
a global online sampling and data collection company with over 11 million panellists. An 
academic search revealed that Research Now has been used extensively in research including 
many Scottish studies. The possibility to set survey quotas for gender and age was offered by 
the panel provider. However, as no data was available on the demographics of energy deciders 
in Scotland to set such quotas against, quota sampling was not applied. Time checks were 
applied to the survey, recording when the participant started and exited the survey. As with 
industry practice, all those that completed the survey in less than 1/3 of the median time were 
eliminated from the survey. These participants were replaced to make up the sample size 
required. 
The survey was first distributed to fellow EMP students to test the design and functioning of 
the survey. After any issues had been resolved the final survey underwent a “soft” launch, where 
it was distributed initially to 10% (n=50) of the total participants. This was to test that the survey 
was also working in the live version (for example to test end links and timing data). After the 
soft launch, the survey was sent to the remain 90% participants. There were no significant 
changes made between the soft launch and full launch; therefor it is viable to use results from 
both stages. 
In total 518 participants completed the survey according to the survey standards. The 
demographics of the panel and their representativeness to the Scottish population is presented 
in Table 4. In the absence of data on the demographics of Scottish energy deciders the 
representativeness was assessed by comparing to the overall Scottish average. It was not possible 
to obtain demographics for those responsible for the energy decisions in their households. The 
categories were chosen were the same as the Scottish Household Survey 2015 to allow for 
comparison. This is deemed more representative and up to date than the 2009 census. However, 
household size statistics were instead used from the census, as the data from the Scottish 
Household Survey was in an inappropriate format for this study. 
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Participants were asked to provide information on the following demographic attributes; 
1. Gender (male; female) 
2. Age (18-24; 25-34; 35-44; 45-59; 60-74; 75+)  
3. Education (Degree, professional qualification; HNC/HND or equivalent; Higher, A 
level or equivalent; Standard Grade, O Grade or equivalent; Other qualification; No 
qualification; Qualification unknown)  
4. Net household income (£0 - £6000; £6001 - £10000; £10001 -£15000; £15001 - 
£20000; £20001 - £25000; £25001 - £30000; £30001 - £40000; £40001+)  
5. Location (Large urban area; Other urban area; Small town; Rural)28 
6. Household size (1;2;3;4;5;6;7 or more) 
7. Household tenure (owner occupied; social rented; private rented; other) 
 
Socioeconomic and demographic attributes were chosen as each of the variables have been 
shown to relate to attitude towards WTP for renewable electricity; income (Kosenius & 
Ollikainen, 2013; Rowlands et al., 2003; Zarnikau, 2003; Ladenburg & Dubgaard, 2007; Zhang 
& Wu, 2012; Štreimikienė & Baležentis, 2015; Sundt and Rehdanz, 2015), age (Kosenius & 
Ollikainen, 2013; Hanemann et al., 2011; Borchers et al., 2007), gender (Bately et al, 2000; 
Bollino, 2009; Ivanona, 2013; Kosenius & Ollikainen, 2013), education (Rowlands et al, 2003; 
Longo et al, 2008; Sundt & Rehdanz, 2015), household size (Longo et al, 2008; Aldy, 2012; 
Koundouri et al, 2009; Bigerna & Polinori, 2014), home owner (Bollino, 2009; Abdullah & 
Jeanty, 2011) and location (Kim et al, 2012; Kosenius & Ollikainen, 2013). 
The panel is representative of the Scottish population for gender (Table 4). For age, the sample 
is not representative of the adult population, however this is to be expected. In the sample, there 
are a relatively low number of young adults under 25yr old (1.3% v 14%), however as many 
young people either live with their parents or at university/college accommodation, they would 
be less likely to be responsible for the energy decision. Furthermore, the sample is 
underrepresented in those over 75 (2.7% v 9%). This would also be expected as a large number 
of those may either be living in retirement homes or with family, and as a result no longer make 
energy decisions. The sample has a greater share of participants in the higher income categories 
than the Scottish average. This could be expected due to similar reasons as with the age 
differences. With less young people who are either in further education or in lower paid entry 
level jobs and fewer participants in retirement age, it could be expected that the energy deciders 
have higher income levels than the Scottish average. The sample has more participants with a 
degree level qualification (40.7% v 29%), as well as more homeowners (71.8% v 61%). The 
sample also has fewer participants who live on their own (20.5% v 35%) and more who live in 
small towns (24.1% v 12%). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 Descriptions of each category were provided in the survey. See appendix for details 
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Table 4 Demographic characteristics of the study sample (n=518) compared to the adult Scottish population. 
Characteristics Survey (%) Scotland Average (%) 
Gender (χ 2=0.21, d.f.=1, p=0.885) 
Male 
Female 
 
 
47.7 
52.3 
 
48 
52 
Age (χ 2=96.672, d.f.=5, p<0.001) 
16-24 
25-34 
35-44 
45-59 
60-74 
75+ 
 
 
1.3* 
14.5 
18.5 
35.9 
25.1 
2.7 
 
14 
16 
15 
26 
20 
9 
Highest qualification (χ 2=75.899, d.f.=6, p<0.001) 
Degree 
HNC 
Higher 
Standard 
Other 
No 
Unknown 
 
 
40.7 
12.7 
19.7 
19.3 
3.3 
5.0 
0.2 
 
29 
11 
17 
20 
4 
17 
1 
Annual net household income (χ 2=85.295, d.f.=7, p<0.001) 
£0-6000 
£6001-10000 
£10001-15000 
£15001-20000 
£20001-25000 
£25001-30000 
£30001-40000 
£40000+ 
 
 
4.4 
3.9 
8.9 
15.4 
14.5 
11.4 
19.1 
22.4 
 
3 
9 
18 
16 
12 
9 
15 
18 
Household tenure (χ 2=34.350, d.f.=3, p<0.001) 
Owner occupied 
Social rented 
Private rented 
Other 
 
 
71.8 
12.5 
14.5 
1.2 
 
61 
23 
14 
1 
Household location (χ 2=73.653, d.f.=3, p<0.001) 
Large urban 
Other urban 
Small town 
Rural 
 
 
32.2 
27.8 
24.1 
15.3 
 
36 
35 
12 
17 
Household size (χ 2=54.543, d.f.=6, p<0.001) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 or more 
 
20.5 
40.1 
19.5 
14.9 
2.9 
1.0 
0.4 
 
35 
34 
15 
11 
4 
0.8 
0.3 
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Timing data 
Another benefit of online surveys is the ability to the record the time taken to answer specific 
questions. Measuring response time in online surveys has several benefits, including ease of  
implementation and cost efficiency, is obtrusive and not perceived by the respondent 
(eliminating potential bias by the respondent), and such additional information is sourced 
without additional questions (Mayerl, 2013). The time it takes to answer a survey question is 
generally accepted to be a reflection of the cognitive effort required to arrive at an answer 
(Lenzner et al., 2010) and such measures are often used as a measure of effort in online surveys, 
including other default studies (Dinner et al., 2011). However, it is important to highlight the 
use of response time in measuring cognitive ability is subject to influence by other factors 
(Kyllonmen & Zu, 2016). These include that a slow response time could reflect a slow 
processing speed or carefulness. A quick and correct answer might be through a lucky guess. If 
the respondent answer incorrectly it could be through not knowing the answer, not spending 
enough time processing the information, or haven gotten confused by the question or answer. 
Although there is a trade-off between speed and accuracy, such a trade-off is not fixed across 
populations or tasks. Furthermore, this thesis will measure the response time from first being 
presented with the question to answering the question. It is important to highlight that the 
length of the experimental treatment questions were slightly different (123, 132, 107 words). 
Although the questions were designed to be relatively similar in length, excessive wording or 
information may have increased the difficulty or framed the question in a different manner 
(Lenzner et al., 2010). 
3.3 Methods for data analysis 
In order to analyze the data, various statistical methods were applied. All statistical analysis was 
carried out in IMB SPSS Statistics version 24. 
To compare the representativeness of the sample against the Scottish adult population a chi-
square (χ2) goodness-of-fit test was applied. The chi-square goodness-of-fit test can be used to 
determine whether the distribution of participants in a single categorical variable follows a 
known distribution with unequal portions. As a result, it is a common method for assessing the 
representative of samples against a known population. 
As with other green energy default studies (Pichert and Katsikopoulos, 2008; Ebeling and Lotz, 
2015; Vetter and Kutzner, 2016), a Pearson's chi-square (χ2) test was applied to test the 
differences in tariff enrolment rates between the three treatments. The Pearson's chi-square test 
evaluates how likely a difference between two or more sets of categorical data arose by chance. 
To compare the whether the time it took participants to answer the different treatment 
questions was significantly different, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was applied. A 
one-way ANOVA is applied when testing whether the differences between the means of two 
or more groups vary significantly. In accordance with standard practice extreme outliers that 
lied without the intervals were removed (Q1 - 3x IQR, Q3 + 3x IQR, where IQR = Q3 - Q1) 
(Tukey, 1977). This resulted in the removal of 22 data sets from this analysis. Full results of the 
data analysis is provided in Appendix III and IV. 
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4 Results 
The following chapter presents the key findings from the experiment and resulting stated and 
actual preferences along with the various statistical analysis conducted. First the results from the 
choices made in experimental treatments and their statistical difference are presented. Secondly, 
the results of the participant's normative preferences are compared to how they chose under 
the three treatments. Finally, the reasons given for those against a green tariff and an analysis of 
the socio-economic variables are presented. 
4.1 Stated and normative preferences 
Stated choices 
When it comes to stated choices, Figure 2 shows the results from the treatment groups. In the 
green default treatment, 81 out of 190 participants (42.6%) chose to stay with the green tariff. 
In the standard default treatment, 81 out of 170 participants (47.6%) chose to opt out and switch 
to the green tariff. In the treatment requiring an active choice, 37 out of 128 participants (24.2%) 
choose the green tariff. 
To test the statistical significance of the effects, a 3 x 2 χ2 test showed a significant overall effect 
of all of the treatment groups on the choices of the participants, χ2(2) = 22.57, p < .001. Then 
in order to assess which of the treatments were statistically significant, three separates 2 x 2 χ2 
tests were calculated. Comparing the two defaults revealed there was no significant difference 
in frequency of choosing the green tariff, χ2(1) = 0.912 and p = .340. When compared with the 
active choice treatment, and contrary to what the emerging literature indicates, more participants 
chose the green tariff in the standard default treatment, χ2(1) = 20,82, p < .001, with a medium 
effect size (Φ = .25). Comparing between the green default treatment and the active choice 
treatment, significantly more participants choose the green tariff in the green default condition 
χ2(1) = 14.21, p < .001, Φ = .20). 
 
Figure 2 Choices of electricity tariff in the three treatment groups 
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Regarding normative choices, participants were asked whether their electricity tariff in real life 
was a standard or green tariff. Figures show that 78% (n=404) of the participants had a standard 
energy tariff, while 8.9% (n=46) had a green tariff and 13.1% (n=68) did not know. For those 
who had a standard tariff or did not know, when asked if they would be willing to switch to a 
green tariff (at the same premium used in the study), 37.7% (n=178) stated they would. When 
combined with those that already had a green tariff, this accounts for 43.2% of the total sample.  
Stated versus Normative preference 
To answer the second research question, the choice of tariff the participants made in the 
different experimental settings was compared to their normative preference in real-life. As 
mentioned previously, as those who already have a green tariff are likely to have paid a premium 
greater than the one used in this study therefore also WTP £2.50 and as a result, can be 
combined with those who currently do not have but are WTP for a green tariff. This was because 
although the price premium reflects what the major energy suppliers used to charge, in reality 
as 100% green is only offered by a number of small companies with far higher premiums, the 
question not applicable. 29 
Results show that green default treatment produced tariff choices different to their actual 
preference. In the green default, of those who either had or would like to have a green tariff (n= 
74), 81.1% (n=60) stayed with the green default, while 18.9% (n=14) actively opted-out of the 
green tariff and chose the standard tariff (Figure 3a). While for those who were not willing to 
pay for a green tariff in real life (n=116), 18.1% (n=21) stayed with the green tariff default, while 
81.9% switched (n=95). As a result, of those that stayed with the green default (n=81), 25.9% 
(n=21) expressed that in real life they would not like a green default (Figure 3b). For those that 
chose to switch to the standard tariff (n=109), 12.8% (n=14) said they would be willing to pay 
for a green tariff in real life.  
In the standard default, participants chose the tariffs that matched their preference more than in 
the green default. Of those who either had or would like to have a green tariff (n= 84), 89.2% 
(n=75) actively opted-out of the standard tariff (Figure 3c). While for those who did not want a 
green tariff in real life (n=86), 93.0% (n=80) stayed with the standard tariff default. As a result, 
of those that chose to stay on the standard default tariff (n=89), 89.9% (n=80) stated this is the 
tariff they would like in real life (Figure 3d). Of those that chose to switch to the green tariff 
(n=81), 92.6% (n=75) stated this is what they would like in real life.   
In the active choice treatment, of those that had expressed a positive willingness to pay for green 
energy (n=66), 50% (n=33) chose the green tariff (Figure 3e). While of the participants who 
stated that they would not like a green tariff (n=92), 95.7% chose the standard default (n=88). 
As a result, of those that chose the green tariff (n=37), 89.2% (n=33) stated this is what they 
would like in real life (Figure 3f). While of those that chose the standard tariff (n=121), 72.7% 
(n=88) stated that this is the tariff they would like in real life.  
 
                                                 
29 Green Electricity Marketplace is an online price comparison website for suppliers offering green electricity in the UK. The 
comparison was run using the locations of major population areas.  Based on the median household UK electricity use of 
3,300kWh 
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Figure 3 How participants chose according to their actual presence (a,c,e) and how this represents the 
proportions of total enrolment in each tariff (b,d,f). (Green = WTP; grey = not WTP) 
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In order to examine whether each treatment group had a similar percentage of participants WTP 
or not for green electricity, the treatments were compared to analyses (Figure 4). Results showed 
that 38.9% of participants in the green default treatment would be WTP in real life, in the 
standard default treatment 49.4% and in the active choice treatment 43.2%. To test whether the 
differences were significant, a 3 x 2 χ2 test was conducted, which showed no significant overall 
difference between all treatment groups, χ2(2) = 4.204, p < .122, suggesting no overall difference 
in actual preferences between the treatment groups. However, when comparing the two default 
treatments specifically, a 2 x 2 χ2 tests revealed a significant difference between the two default 
treatments (χ2(1) = 3.990, p = .0.46). This suggests that the standard default treatment had a 
significantly greater proportion of those who would be WTP for green energy than the green 
default treatment. When compared with the active choice treatment, there was no significant 
difference compared to the green treatment (χ2(1) = 0.286, p = .593) or the standard default 
condition (χ2(1) = 1,926, p = .165). 
 
 
Figure 4 Percentage of each experimental treatment group that were WTP for renewable energy (green) or not 
(grey). 
Timing data 
As a proxy for cognitive effort, the latent time it took for each participant to answer the 
treatment questions were analysed. Results indicate that there was a statistically significant 
difference between each treatment group as determined by one-way ANOVA (F(2,493) = 
30.757, p <.001). A Tukey post hoc test revealed that the time to answer the question was 
statistically and significantly longer for both the green default (mean=29.3, SD = 16.6 seconds, 
p < .001) and standard default treatments (mean=31.0, SD=18.4 seconds, p < .001) compared 
to the active choice treatment (mean = 17.5, S.D = 14.2 seconds). There was no statistically 
significant difference between the green default and standard default treatments (p = .587). A 
concern was that some participants might have answered too quickly. When these were removed 
(<5 seconds, n=27), this had no effect on the overall significance levels (F(2,466) = 23.073, p < 
.001) or on the statistical difference between both defaults and the active choice (p < .001), while 
no statistical difference between the two default treatments (p = .868). The results suggest that 
those results can be kept in the analysis. 
Secondly the timing data was analysed to examine whether there was a difference between the 
time taken between those participants who chose to stick with a default and those who decided 
to opt-out (Table 5). Participants who stuck with the default took the same time in making that 
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decision as those who chose to opt-out in both default treatments. In the active choice 
treatment, those who chose green spent significantly longer on that decision than those who 
actively chose the standard tariff. This suggests that participants took just as long to decide to 
stick with a default, then those who decided to opt-out. However, in the active choice treatment, 
those who chose the green tariff took almost twice as long over the question than those who 
chose the standard tariff. 
Table 5 Time taken to answer based on decision made 
Treatment condition Decision Mean time in seconds (SD) 
Green default 
F(1,179)=0.179, p=.673 
 
Green tariff 
Standard tariff 
28.7 (15.5) 
29.7(17.4) 
Standard default 
F(1,159) =.410, p=.523 
 
Green tariff 
Standard tariff 
30.1 (18.1) 
31.9 (18.7) 
Active choice 
F(1,152)=21.396, p=.000 
Green tariff 
Standard tariff 
26.7 (15.2) 
14.8 (12.8) 
 
Next, the timing data was analysed to examine if those that had a normative preference for green 
tariffs took the same time in deciding as those that did not want a green tariff. Results showed 
no significant difference irrespective of treatments (F(1,494) = 2.693, p = .101). When the timing 
data was analysed within each treatment, there was a significant difference in the green 
treatment, but not in the standard default or active choice (Table 6). In the green default, those 
who would like a green tariff in real life took a shorter time in deciding than those who did not. 
This suggests that those already with a preference for a green energy took less in choosing under 
the green default treatment, but not under the standard or active choice treatments.  
Table 6 Time taken to answer based on WTP for green energy 
Treatment WTP for a green tariff Mean time in seconds (SD) 
Green 
F(1,179) = 12.943, p <.001 
 
Yes 
No 
23.9 (13.1) 
32.7 (17.7) 
Standard 
F(1,159) = .414, p =.521 
 
Yes 
No 
30.1 (18.4) 
32.0 (18.5) 
Active choice 
F(1,152) = 1.105, p =.315 
Yes 
No 
18.9 (16.5) 
16.5 (12.4) 
 
Finally, the timing data for those who revealed a preference for green tariffs in the active choice 
treatment was analysed depending on whether they chose accordingly to their preference or not.  
Those who had an actual preference for green tariffs and chose a green tariff took on average 
26.5 seconds, while those whose actual preference for green tariffs but chose a standard tariff 
took on average 11.7 seconds. Analysis revealed a significant difference between the times 
(F(1,62) = 15.657, p < .001). A binary logistic regression then predicted preference choice with 
the continuous time on the probability of choosing their preference was significant (p < .001). 
It was not possible to run the same analysis in either of the default treatments as the majority 
acted according to their preferences resulting in low samples.  
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Stated reasons against green tariffs 
Table 7 shows that reasons given by those not willing to pay for a green tariff (n=294). The 
majority of participants who did a want green tariff in real life stated that price was a key reason. 
Of those that listed price as one of the main reasons (n=203), 49.8% (n=101) mentioned it as 
the sole reason against the green tariff. A lack of information on green tariffs and being content 
enough with current tariff were the next most mentioned reasons. Very few stated that mitigating 
the effects of climate change was not their responsibility. Nine participants chose to answer 
‘another’ in addition to the answer categories provided, these answers were coded categorised 
or removed (see Appendix II for the details).  
Table 7 Participants reasons for not wanting a green tariff (n = 294) 
Reason  Frequency (%) 
Unwilling to spend any more on electricity than currently am 69 
Not enough information given on green tariffs 27 
Content enough with my current tariff  26 
Environmental benefits do not justify the costs 21 
Do not see the need for a green tariff 16 
Do not know anyone else with a green tariff 12 
Effort and time switching 9 
Mitigating climate change is not my responsibility  3 
 
As with other studies (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008) price was by far most common reason 
given for those unwilling to pay for a green tariff in real life (69%). This supports other studies 
which state that electricity competition in the UK is still very price driven with cost by far the 
most important factor in switching behaviour (Diaz-Rainey & Ashton, 2008; Hast et al., 2014). 
However, of those that mentioned an unwillingness to spend any more, around half of those 
also stated at least one other reason for not wanting a green energy tariff. Therefore although 
the price is an important factor, even if green tariffs were to reach grid parity a significant sector 
would still be unwilling to choose green tariffs due to other factors. 
The second most common reason for not wanting green energy was a lack of information on 
green tariffs (27%), which can be seen as high in relation to other studies (Pichert & 
Katsikopoulos, 2008). This could be as a result of the controversy regarding previous green 
tariffs from energy suppliers in the UK. This result would further support the hypothesis that a 
lack of trust is influencing behaviour. Very few of those who do want a green tariff saw 
mitigating climate change as not their responsibility (3%).  
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5 Discussion 
The following chapter will present a reflection and interpretation of the results observed.. The 
discussion is framed according to (potential) hypothesis of observed results rather than 
breakdowns of each treatment due to overlapping influences. A reflection on the 
methodological issues of the study is also provided.  
5.1 Overall enrolment 
Contrary to similar studies (Table 8), the results show that there was no statistical difference 
between a green default and a standard default for the total enrolment of green electricity tariffs. 
Furthermore, both defaults had statistically and significantly greater effect on enrolment of 
green tariffs than the active choice treatment. However, it is important to stress each study had 
several major differences including experimental design, participant demographics, price 
premiums (ranging from 5 to 50%) and sample size. 
Table 8 Comparison of results for enrolment of green energy default studies 
Study Green Default (%) Standard Default (%) Active choice (%) 
This thesis 42 48 24 
Pichert & Katsikopoulos (2008) 68 41 67 
Hedlin & Sunstein (2016) 39 26 56 
Momsen & Stork (2014) 70 Did not investigate 48 
Ebeling & Lotz (2015) 69 7 Did not investigate 
The results from Vetter and Kutzner (2016) were not included as they are presented in format that is non-comparable 
One potential reason for the high enrolment in green energy under the standard default 
treatment, is that it had a significantly greater proportion of participants WTP for green energy 
(49.4%) compared to the green default treatment (38.9%). However, this would only partially 
explain the dissimilarities with other studies. By examining the relationship between the choices 
made in the treatments and the revealed preferences in real life, this can begin to offer some 
further explanations of the observed results. 
5.2 Choice architect and lack of trust? 
An important result of the green default treatment was that 18.9% of participants who stated 
they would be willing to pay for green tariff in real life, choose to act against that preference and 
actively opt-out of the green default tariff. This suggests a significant presence of policy 
backfiring in the green default treatment. Although not able to determine the exact reasons for 
such behaviour in this study, from previous studies and theories one potential reason is due to 
the trust in the choice architect (see chapter 2.4.4.).  
Neither the identity of the choice architect or the reasons for the default were given. The reason 
the agent is not provided was twofold: to prevent any potential framing from the outset and it 
is unknown who this agent would be in real life (mandatory regulation or a voluntary scheme 
by the energy supplier). Also, most talk is in the realm of governments (Lehner et al.) in the case 
of the Pichert and Katsikopoulos (2008)real life example. The purpose of the default is not 
given so as comparable with other studies. This is supported by other studies showing that 
revealing the influence purpose of the default does effectiveness (Loewenstein et al., 2015; 
Bruns et al., 2016; Kroese et al., 2016; Steffel et al., 2016). 
It is important to highlight that the reasoning behind the existence of the green default (i.e. the 
identity of choice architect) was excluded from the study, which may have led participants to 
interpret that the energy supplier as the choice architect. Furthermore, as stated the authors of 
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the survey were not presented so to avoid pre-framing which may have influenced results. 
Therefore participants might also have perceived the survey to originate from an energy 
supplier. To examine how the lack of trust may have influenced the results, it is first necessary 
to provide a short background into the energy market in the UK and its history of green tariff 
offerings. 
Overview of trust and green tariffs in the UK 
Studies have shown that consumer trust in the UK energy sector is very low (Which, 2013; 
CarbonBrief, 2014; uSwitch, 2013) with media outlets often reporting on skyrocketing profits 
while householder bills continue to rise (Metro, 2013). As a result, the UK energy sector is one 
of the least trusted industries in the UK and one of the least trusted energy sectors in Europe 
(Edelman, 2014; Citizens Advice, 2015). This lack of trust is often cited as a consequence of the 
rising energy prices (Edelman, 2014) and as a result, there is a common perception by consumers 
of excessive profiteering by UK energy companies (OFGEM, 2013).  
As stated in the problem definition, all the major energy suppliers had previously offered green 
tariffs in one form or another. However, before these were abandoned, they were not without 
controversy. First, there was confusion over what was meant by a green tariff. There was no 
specific definition of a “green” tariff, with five broad categories which UK energy suppliers 
marketed individually or in combination, which Diaz-Rainey and Ashton (2008) define as;  
• Green source (the energy supplier guarantees to buy between 10% and 100% of energy 
generated by renewable sources for every unit of electricity used by the consumer); 
• Green source large hydro (the supplier matches every unit of electricity used by the consumer 
with hydro-electric generated electricity); 
• Green fund new renewables (electricity may not be derived from renewable energy, yet funds 
are invested in renewable generation projects); 
• Green fund other environmental (these tariffs provide funds to support environmental causes 
or new research and development projects); 
• Carbon offsets (supplier donates to a carbon reduction project in the UK or internationally 
in order to offset the impact of the households’ carbon footprint).”  
 
This lead to confusion with customers, with few being aware of exactly what a green tariff meant 
or that different types of green tariffs even existed (OFGEM, 2014b). 
Secondly, there were claims that the environmental benefits of green tariffs were being double 
counted by the energy suppliers (Hast et al., 2014). The renewable obligation system in the UK 
legally obliged to energy companies to source or produce a specific share of their energy from 
renewable sources. To pay for this, the extra cost was added to the standard tariff bills. However, 
energy suppliers were not making it clear to customers that they were already paying to support 
renewables through their standard energy bills (Graham, 2006). The renewable electricity they 
were obliged to source or produce, would then be sold to customers through a voluntary green 
tariff, often at a premium. As a result, energy companies were both profiteering as well as double 
counting the environmental benefits of the renewable energy, with those customers on the green 
energy tariff having little impact on increasing overall renewable energy generation (Hast et al., 
2014). 
This confusion and controversy led governmental consultations in 2005 (OFGEM, 2005) and 
2007 (OFGEM, 2007) eventually leading to OFGEM introducing the 2009 “Green Supply 
Guidelines” (OFGEM, 2009) aimed at providing certainty and transparency to energy users that 
the product was “green”. The guidelines were voluntary and implemented through the “Green 
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Energy Supply Certification Scheme” (GESCS). However not all suppliers signed up which saw 
in the years following the green electricity market diverged into an GESCS accredited and non-
accredited market. This lead to in 2014 OFGEM improving consumer protection for all green 
tariffs (OFGEM, 2014c). However, despite such efforts at improving credibility, it is possible 
that a lack of trust in green tariff offerings still remains in the UK. 
Default effect when a lack of trust in CA 
As described there is a low level of trust in the UK energy sector and that the choice architect 
of the default may well have been perceived as being an energy company. If the participants 
therefore perceived that the choice architect was untrustworthy, this could explain the backlash 
observed.  Individuals who trust the policy maker (or expert advice) are more likely to stick with 
the default, while those who distrust more likely to leave (Tannenbaum & Ditto, 2012). As 
mentioned, the default can be interpreted as an endorsement by the agent, providing a 
recommendation to the individual. However if such recommendations are unsolicited by the 
individual, this can activate individual reactance, which can lead to a backlash in which the 
individual can both ignore the recommendation but also intentionally contradict such advice 
(Fitzsimons & Lehmann, 2004).  
As highlighted there is a common perception that UK energy suppliers are guilty of excessive 
profiteering. Therefore the participants may have inferred that the default is the one the energy 
company prefers to sell, especially due to the higher price (Brown and Krishna, 2004). 
Therefore, due to the lack of trust previously mentioned, and perception of the default, 
participants could interpret a profiteering strategy by the energy company and ulterior motive. 
Sunstein (add date) shows that individuals reject nudges if they are perceived to have such illicit 
motivations, even if the nudge is supporting their own choice (for example political party or 
religion). 
Campbell and Kirmani (2000) propose that when a consumer becomes apprehensive that the 
seller is acting illicitly, then persuasion knowledge is used. Persuasion knowledge is based on 
Friestad and Wright’s (1994) ‘Persuasion Knowledge Model’, a theory on how consumers 
respond to a seller’s attempt at persuasion30. Campbell and Kirmani (2000) propose that 
consumer use of persuasion knowledge is based on two factors: i) the accessibility of the motives 
of the persuasion, and ii) the cognitive capacity of the consumer. They show through a series of 
experiments how the accessibility of an ulterior motive increases the use of persuasion 
knowledge. If a consumer becomes concerned about illicit motivations then ‘marketplace 
metacognition’ (MM) will be more prominent to cope with marketers perceived persuasion 
attempt. Wright’s (2002) concept of marketplace metacognition and social intelligence31 refers 
to MM as “everyday individuals’ thinking about market-related thinking. This includes people’s beliefs about 
their own and others’ mental states and processes and their beliefs about other people’s beliefs on those topics as 
these beliefs pertain to the specific domain of marketplace cooperation and manipulation.” (Wright, 2002, p. 
667). 
Marketplace metacognition can not only include consumer theories regarding what products are 
suitable, but it can also change cognitive processes regarding decision making (Brown & 
Krishna, 2004). As a result, invoking MM may cause consumers to consider more the alternative 
                                                 
30 “Persuasion knowledge refers to consumers’  theories  about  persuasion  and  includes beliefs about marketers’ motives, 
strategies, and tactics; effectiveness   and   appropriateness  of   persuasion  tactics; psychological mediators of tactic 
effectiveness; and ways of coping  with  persuasion  attempts.” (Campbell & Kirmani (2000) p1). 
31 ““Marketplace social intelligence refers to the cognitive routines and con- tents  dedicated  to  achieving  marketplace  efficacy  
that  are accessible  to  individuals  by  virtue of  functionally specialized  evolutionary  processes  and  the  development  of  
this functionally  specialized  expertise  over  an  individual’s life span” 
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choices of a decision in a default setting. This could potentially reduce the effect of satisficing 
behaviour and lead to the consumer choosing the maximum utility. A key implication is that 
when MM is invoked, consumers are sceptical and their cognitive effort used in decision-making 
increases (Brown & Krishna, 2004). Wegner and Petty (1995) argue that when cognitive effort 
is low (or related decisions are infrequent), consumers are more likely to accept a default. 
However, when consumers invoke perceptions of persuasion attempts, cognitive effort is 
enhanced, and consumers are more likely to contrast such efforts. Furthermore, the accessibility 
of MM may not only make consumers more sceptical, it may also increase their motivational 
reasoning (Kunda, 1990). Therefore, the presence of a default from a choice architect which the 
consumer may be sceptical, it likely to increase the cognitive effort he/she puts into making the 
decision (Brown & Krishna, 2004). This leads to consumers being more alert and more careful 
consideration of the choices. 
To address cognitive efforts, the time it takes an individual to answer questions has been used 
to as a proxy for cognitive effort in previous default studies (Dinner et al., 2011). In this case, 
results show that participants took considerably longer in answering in both the green default 
(29.3 seconds) and standard default treatments (31.0 seconds) than those in the active choice 
treatment (17.5 seconds). This suggests that due to the lack of trust in UK energy suppliers, 
consumers were more sceptical about a default and its intentions which led to them spending 
more time on the decision, which in turn results in a better match of their preferences (default 
effect is reduced). As a result, the default may work because it requires consumers to put more 
effort into the decisions than under the active choice scenario.  
Furthermore, there was no time difference between sticking with the default or switching in 
either the green default (28.7 v 29.7 seconds) or in the standard default (31.9 v 30.1 seconds). 
This goes against other studies which suggested that individuals who stick with the default spend 
less time on that decision than those who actively decide to opt-out. The results support the 
hypothesis that the lack of trust in the perceived choice architect is resulting in the participants 
spending more time and effort on decisions, even when the default matches their preference.  
Furthermore, the results from regression analysis in the active choice treatment show that the 
more time a participant who has a normative preference for green energy spends on answering 
the question, the more likely they will choose the green tariff. This is in line with the general 
acceptance that the more effort an individual puts into a decision, the more in line their final 
decision is with their actual preference. The results go against the hypothesis that the active 
choice would result in one of the higher enrolments. The hypothesis was based on studies such 
as Hedlin and Sunstein (2016), who found that forcing participants to make an active choice 
resulted in a high enrolment in green energy, due in part to participants felt guiltier having to 
actively chose ‘against’ a green tariff. In this case however, without any additional information 
regarding the benefits of renewable electricity, or even explicitly stating that the green was more 
environmentally friendly, guilt may not have been triggered in this study to the same degree. 
Furthermore, the shorter time spent may not be enough to trigger comparison with social 
norms, thus reducing the impact of guilt, with price weighing more heavily. It has been suggested 
that the active choice treatment leads to the highest match between attitude and behaviour as it 
forces the individual to make a choice rather than one being made for them. The results from 
this study would argue against that argument. Timing data revealed that participants took 
statistically and significantly shorter on the active choice treatment than in the defaults.  
5.3 Potential manipulation 
An important result is that those that stayed with the green tariff when it was the default, were 
not just those who had expressed a preference to pay, but also those who had not. For those 
whose preference was not wanting a more expensive green tariff, 18.1% stayed with the green 
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default even though it was not their actual preference. As a result far more of those participants 
who stated they would not like a green tariff, chose the green tariff when it was the default 
treatment, then either in the standard default (7%) or the active choice (4.3%) treatment. 
Furthermore, when viewed as the total of enrolment in a green tariff when it is the default, those 
that for whom it is not their preference make up over a quarter (25.9%) of the total enrolment 
in green energy. Therefor the (potential) success of the green tariff over the active choice, can 
be attributed in part to enrolling those for whom it was not their preference. 
Although the study could not determine the exact reasons behind such behaviour, it does 
highlight a previously overlooked impact of green energy defaults that may occur. Although this 
is not conclusive evidence of manipulation, it does suggest the possible presence of such. As 
discussed in the ethics section the definition of manipulation is complex and difficult to assess. 
However, Hansen and Jergensen (2013) state that for nudges such as green energy defaults, 
choice architects “should [not only] make sure that the ends pursued are carefully calibrated 
with what citizens judge to be in their interests.” (p 26).  Furthermore, nudging by governments 
is only morally acceptable when it brings consumers decisions in line with their preferences 
(Boven, 2009). Thus, comparing decisions made under a default scenario with the actual 
preference of the individual provides a reasonable indication of potential manipulation. 
As discussed defaults work through various factors which can significantly influence behaviour. 
The results of this study suggest that such factors (inertia, guilt, endorsement, satisficing) may 
override the actual preference of the individual, resulting in choosing a more expensive energy 
tariff which they would. As a result this also highlights the other green default studies that have 
found high enrolment rates with green defaults. Are the high enrolments in green defaults from 
those who are willing to pay, or are others being influenced into choices against their preference?  
5.4 Other potential factors affecting the results 
There are several other factors that could have resulted in the behaviour observed. As with the 
previous discussion the study was not able to test their specific influence, however such factors 
are important to highlight. 
Irrationality, learning and constructed preferences 
The discrepancies observed between choices made in the experimental treatments and actual 
preferences could also be through irrational behaviour. Due to the hypothetical nature of the 
survey, participants may have not been taking the survey seriously or been paying attention, 
although the removal of those that spent too little time on the survey would counter the later. 
However, Carlsson (2010) highlights that unstable preferences throughout an experiment does 
not imply irrational behaviour. Instead, the respondent could be learning their preferences 
throughout the experiment. As this study created a hypothetical market setting, some 
respondents may not have fully developed their preferences during the treatment. Therefore, 
between answering the treatment questions and revealing their real life preference, respondents 
may be forming or even changing their preference (Carlsson, 2010).  
Responsibility 
The high number of the participants WTP for green energy who opted out in the standard tariff 
could be reactance to the perception of the energy provider actively encouraging and promoting 
of a non-environmental tariff. If a participant makes such inferences, this may motivate the 
consumer to override those cognitive limitations and biases that would have otherwise caused 
them to stick with the default. The energy companies have a large responsibility in mitigating 
climate change (CDP, 2017) and if consumers interpret that they are actively trying to get out 
of that responsibility, by actively restricting the green energy market, this could encourage such 
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consumers to act on their preference. Furthermore, to avoid pre-framing, the purpose and actor 
behind the survey were kept from the participants. This might have affected results if consumers 
thought the results could go towards an energy supplier’s policy (strategic bias), they may have 
been worried that if they did not choose green, then the suppliers would not offer the option 
of having a green tariff. 
Freedom of choice 
Another reason for the possible backfiring that occurred in the green default treatment could 
be from a perceived threat to autonomy, as mentioned in the ethics chapter. As mentioned in 
the ethical implications, even though a default does not limit choice, a perception of violation 
of autonomy or freedom can still exist as well as indicate a lack of freedom in the future. 
However, there were lower levels of potential backfiring in the standard default. Therefore, 
either 1) the behaviour was not due to a perceived violation of autonomy; 2) violation of 
autonomy was perceived in both treatments, but reactance was overruled by other factors in the 
standard default treatment (such as price); 3) violation of autonomy was only perceived in the 
green default treatment (due possibly to the price premium of the green default). The latter is 
supported by Hedlin and Sunstein (2015) who found greater reactance with green defaults only 
when they cost extra than with standard energy defaults. Thus, it is possible that Scottish 
consumers do not perceive defaults as a loss of autonomy, however, do object when the default 
costs more.  
Consumer experience 
The disparity of the default effects to other studies may also be as a result of the existing market 
experience of the participants. Studies have shown that the effects of defaults are reduced by 
individual experience on the topic (List 2003, Löfgren et al., 2012). This is supported by Brown 
and Krishna (2004) who found that knowledge and/or previous experience can influence 
whether individuals stick with a default. The UK has one of the highest switching rates for 
electricity in Europe (ACER/CEER, 2014), with multiple campaigns and regulations 
encouraging such behaviour (such as Ofgem’s 2011 campaign,32  The Big Switch33, Energy best deal34) 
As a result, as UK consumers are relatively used to switching, this may have influenced the 
different behaviour in the default, reducing the impact of such effects such as the status quo 
bias and the endowment effect. 
Disruption 
A key contributing factor to the default effect is the status quo bias. However, studies have 
shown that the status quo bias can be disrupted by significant life events such as moving to a 
new house. As the experimental survey asked participants to imagine such a scenario, this could 
have contributed to the similarities between the two default situations.  
 
 
 
                                                 
32 https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/76314/energy-best-deal-video-release-pdf 
33 https://www.theguardian.com/money/2012/feb/07/big-switch-campaign-cheaper-energy-bills 
34 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/switch-to-save-27-billion-up-for-grabs-by-switching-energy-supplier 
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5.5 WTP for renewable electricity in Scotland 
43.2% of the participants either had a green electricity tariff or would be willing to pay a 
premium for one. This supports previous studies such as (Diaz-Rainey & Ashton, 2008) who 
found in the UK 42% of participants would be willing to pay 5-10% more for green electricity 
from renewable sources. However, the sample used in this study did contain a large number of 
participants already with a green tariff (8.9%). Given the low market share of those companies 
which currently offer green tariffs, these results suggest the sample is overrepresented with 
participants with a green tariff. 
5.6 Methodological Issues 
The hypotheses presented in this study rest on several key assumptions. Firstly, that preferences 
misclassification can be an indicator for potential manipulation by the default. However, the 
study stresses that such hypotheses are treated with caution and makes no claim to prove any 
relationship. Secondly that time taken in answering the experimental treatment is an indicator 
for cognitive effort. Although this is supported by other literature, there are many assumptions 
in uses such information as a proxy. These were clearly stated in the methodology. Finally, this 
study is not able to prove any of the factors that influence the default effect caused the behaviour 
observed. Such studies are very difficult. The study acknowledges that such results could occur 
through irrational behaviour and hypothetical bias associated with online survey experiments. 
 
There are a number of methodological issues regarding the experimental design also. In reality 
consumers would unlikely make a decision so quickly and if not the sole energy decider, would 
discuss such decisions with co-deciders. Furthermore consumers in reality rarely experience a 
dichotomous choice for electricity tariff between green and standard tariffs, they would also 
face differing price structures which may impact the result. Such tariffs were not implemented 
as it was deemed to be too specific to the UK and thus reduce the external validity. Furthermore, 
from a policy perspecitve it would be unrealistic to rapidly adjust energy mix to match a sudden 
enrolment in green tariffs via a default policy. Finally, due to a lack of available demographic 
data on energy deciders, it is unclear how representative panel is of the target population. 
 
The use of online surveys have several advantages over other methods that make it applicable 
to this study. These include; low costs, short response time, large samples, ease of statistical data 
transfer, ability to perform randomized block design, suitable for non-linear design and reduced 
interview bias (Ilieva et al., 2002; Evans & Marthur, 2005; Szolnoki & Hoffmann, 2013). As with 
any experiment, it is necessary to keep in mind all possible bias in the research. The bias can be 
split into bias regarding the experiment design and selection bias regarding the survey 
population (Table 9). 
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Table 9 Potential bias and mitigation measures 
Bias Comments 
Hypothetical bias * As there is no real consequence in this study there is the potential for hypothetical 
bias. Participants were asked to answer as if they would in real life to reduce such bias. 
However previous default studies have shown close results between hypothetical 
stated preferences and real-life observations (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003) 
Social desirability bias 
* 
It was clearly stated that all responses would be anonymous, thus reducing behavioural 
bias (List et al., 2004)  
Researcher/ 
Interviewer bias * 
The identity of the institution was not provided to reduce potential of manipulation 
(Levitt & List, 2007) 
Survey bias* In order to remove survey bias the order that the answers appeared were randomized. 
Secondly the wording of the default treatments was designed to be as similar as 
possible. 
Respondent 
fraud/bias * 
Each respondent was allocated a unique ID from the panel company which was 
recorded in the survey and reported back to the panel company. 
Coverage bias ** Online surveys are limited to internet users. However, the UK has a high internet use 
with 89% users (87% Scotland) with only 9% never having used the internet (Office 
for National Statistics, 2017). 
Self-selection/panel 
bias ** 
Not everyone on the internet will be on a panel. Although there is a possibility to 
include quota sampling, this was not chosen as the sample of decision makers is 
unknown. As a result, it is not possible to accurately accept or reject self-selection bias 
and the representativeness of the study to the Scottish population. As a result, the 
demographics of the sample are clearly stated.  
Nonresponse bias ** Not everyone on the panel who is invited will take part and of those who do some 
may drop out. However as only 3% dropped out when completing the survey this 
should minimize the potential for nonresponse bias (Huggins et al., 2002).  
* experimental design bias, ** online survey bias 
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6 Conclusion 
Green nudges are seen by many as an attractive option for promoting pro-environmental 
behaviour, offering a low-cost and effective tool without resorting to reducing individual 
freedoms. As such, green nudges are becoming an increasing component of environmental 
policy conversations in countries and institutions around the globe. Of such green nudges, the 
green default for household electricity supply is an often-cited example of how to effectively 
increase pro-environmental behaviour. However, these arguments have been based on only a 
few studies, with those that have only examining the effectiveness through total enrolment 
figures alone. This study is first to the author’s knowledge that examines how consumer choice 
of green electricity made under different default situations, reflect their actual real-life 
preferences. 
6.1 Main findings 
The study shows that energy decision makers are more likely to choose a green tariff when it is 
presented as the default, than when presented as an active choice. However, the study also 
reports a surprising result that, contrary to other studies, enrolment in green tariffs in the 
standard energy default produced similar results to that of the green default. As a result, the 
findings of this study only partially support the findings of other studies in this field.  Although 
the treatment group for the standard default did have more participant that were WTP for green 
energy than the green default treatment, there are a number of other reasons which may have 
produced such behaviour (as explained when answering the second research question). By 
examining how participants decision under the different treatments reflected their actual 
preference, hypothesis for the observed behaviour can been formulated. 
RQ 1. How do electricity tariff decisions made under different default 
settings reflect a consumer’s actual/normative preference? 
Overall, a green energy default does not appear to effectively match consumers to their 
normative preferences. First, of those participants who stated a WTP for green energy in real 
life, when this option was presented as the default, almost a fifth (18.9%) chose instead to opt-
out. Although this study was not able to examine the exact reasons for such behaviour, several 
hypotheses are proposed. First the setting of the experiment may have had a significant impact 
on the behaviour. Previous studies have shown that when consumers are sceptical over the 
purpose of the default and if from an untrustworthy source (especially when at a premium), this 
can cause consumers to choose against the default even if it was their preferred choice. UK 
energy consumers have very low trust in energy suppliers due to a reputation of excessive 
profiteering. Furthermore, many of whom have a controversial history of offering premium 
green tariffs that offered little environmental benefits. Thus, although a consumer may be WTP 
for energy from renewable sources, if this is presented as a more expensive green default from 
an untrustworthy agent, then consumer scepticism will result in choosing an alternative. A key 
hypothesis is that the longer a participant took on the decision, the more in line the choice is 
with their preferences. This is supported by the results of the active choice treatment. Secondly 
the hypothesis that the lack of trust in the perceived choice architect is results in the participants 
spending more time and effort on decisions, even when the default matches their preference. 
This hypothesis is also supported by the results. As a result, this study supports previous 
research that, along with other cognitive theories, defaults when perceived low trust agent, also 
work by encouraging more time and effort to be allocated into the decision making, thus better 
matching the choices made with actual preferences.  
A further finding is that over a quarter (25.9%) of those who chose to stick with a green tariff 
when presented as a default, were from participants who expressed that this would not be WTP 
for a green tariff in real life. Although without the resources to identify the exact motivations 
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for such behaviour, there are several hypotheses including participant irrationality or 
unconstructed preferences. However, the results cannot overlook the identification of potential 
manipulation by the default setting. That those factors which make the default a powerful tool 
(e.g. inertia, guilt, endorsement) may be strong enough to override the actual preference of the 
individual. Such results have serious philosophical, phycological and socio-economic concerns. 
It is important to stress that this thesis did not have the resources to identify the exact 
motivation of such behaviour. Furthermore the several assumptions are made in the 
classification of preferences. However the results from this study provides a valuable motivation 
for further research into the suggested factors discussed. 
RQ 2. What are the policy implications for green energy defaults? 
This research raises a number of important policy issues for the role of green energy defaults. 
Green energy defaults have been receiving a lot of attention from policy makers recently despite 
a relatively few number of studies. This study, strongly suggests that defaults are very context 
and market-specific and thus can behave differently to expected from other studies. The 
behaviour of green default may be very dependent to the market setting, trust, price and the 
mechanism. The findings and potential motivations from this study highlight two important 
policy implications. 
Green defaults are not a panacea 
The first key finding is that not all consumers who are WTP for a green tariff remain with the 
green default. The results show that although green energy defaults lead to greater enrolment 
than active choices in enrolment according to preferences, there are still those who chose to 
opt-out. This is an important finding not previously identified by other studies. 
Policy makers therefor need be able to identify the motivation behind such behaviour and 
thereby design a green default to mitigate such effects. Although this study was not able to 
identify the exact cause, from other research and the previous market experience, the lack of 
trust in UK energy companies, coupled with previous controversy and confusion with green 
tariffs, may have produced such results. This is supported by previous studies examining the 
disparities between a WTP and behaviour in the UK, which found that the low uptake of green 
tariff was not just due to cognitive limitations, but also due to low trust in energy suppliers, 
consumer confusion and a lack of effective guidelines (Boardman et al. 2006; Graham 2006; 
Diaz-Rainey & Ashton, 2008). If such factors remain in the present market, then the 
effectiveness of a green default will undoubtedly be restricted.  
Therefore, one of the main policy implications from this research is that a green energy default 
should not be seen a single solution to correcting the attitude-behaviour gap. That a green 
default does not by itself fully correct the attitude behaviour gap for WTP for green energy for 
which it is justified. Therefor from a policy perspective, it is recommended that the introduction 
of a green energy default should be seen as a supportive policy measure aiming to address 
various issues that could be limiting the uptake of green energy. However as discussed in the 
next policy implication, green energy defaults should not be designed to be powerful enough to 
overcome concerns such as lack of trust, consumer confusion and lack of information, as these 
are all valid and rational reasons against choosing a green tariff despite being WTP extra for 
renewable electricity. 
The lack of trust in energy suppliers and its implications should not be ignored by policy makers. 
Consumer scepticism in the UK of energy suppliers has had a negative impact on previous 
energy policy aimed at reducing carbon emissions (Mundaca, 2007; Murray, 2014). Consumer 
distrust in energy providers reduced uptake of smart meters, as consumers are sceptical about 
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why energy suppliers are encouraging them to use less energy (when this their main business 
model). However policy makers should not be aware of the levels of trust in the energy suppliers, 
but also the levels of trust in governments. For example in the US where energy companies have 
higher trust, studies have shown that governmental endorsement can instead consumer backfire 
behaviour (Arad & Rubnstein, 2015). As a result, such default energy policy should be country 
specific, and identify how trust in different stakeholders may impact consumer behaviour of 
such policies. Despite this, the policy recommendations still provide good practice for those in 
other liberalized energy markets even with higher trust level. 
Finally, policy makers should focus not only on increasing green energy enrolment through 
reducing potential backfiring, but also be focusing on the removing the barriers of those against 
a green tariff. Although the main reason against wanting a green tariff was the extra price, there 
were a number of other factors which public policy should focus which present a more cost-
effective strategy. These include a lack of information and consumer attitude towards renewable 
energy and climate change. By addressing such issues, this could not only increase consumer 
preference for green tariff, but could also lead to increased pro-environmental behaviour in 
other areas (e.g. educating consumers regarding the need to reduce fossil fuel use could also lead 
to increased public transport use). Focusing on the default alone would overlook such additional 
benefits. 
Ethics and fuel poverty 
As discussed, the results show that a green default can result in consumers choosing a green 
tariff against their preferences. These preferences are based on valid reasons including an 
unwillingness to spend anymore and a lack of information. This highlights a serious issue for 
policy makers considering the introduction of a green energy default. Not only does this pose 
serious moral and ethical issues regarding manipulation, as green tariffs are in most cases more 
expensive this could have serious socio-economics implications. Of those that chose to remain 
on the green default despite not willing to in real-life, over half of the participants (n=11) stated 
the reason that in real life they were unwilling to spend any more on their electricity bills. 
Although the sample is too small to show significance, a greater proportion of those participants 
were in the income brackets most associated with fuel poverty35. Fuel poverty is defined by the 
Scottish Government as “a household is in fuel poverty if, in order to maintain a satisfactory heating regime, 
it would be required to spend more than 10% of its income on all household fuel use” (Scottish Executive, 
2002, p. 6). 
To highlight the important policy implications of defaults potentially enrolling energy 
consumers who cannot afford them, a brief summary of the current social landscape in Scotland 
is provided. Fuel poverty is a serious issue in Scotland with the most recent statistics showing 
that in 2015, 30.7% (or 748,000) of households in Scotland were in fuel poverty, and 8.3% (or 
203,000 households) were living in extreme fuel poverty (20% or more of income on energy 
bills). Although this is a reduction from 34.9% in 2014, over half of the 4.2% reduction was due 
to reduction in fuel costs (2.3 percentage points), which came from a reduction in heating oil, 
not electricity (Scottish Government, 2016). As a result, fuel poverty remains a serious issue 
especially for those who use electricity for heating. Currently 12 % of Scottish households use 
electricity as their primary fuel (Scottish Government, 2017) and over half are fuel poor (54%), 
contributing to 21% of the total fuel poor (Scottish Government, 2016).  
Fuel poverty has serious health effects with a direct association with excess winter deaths (or 
increased winter mortality) due to the association with low indoor temperatures (NRS, 2016).  
                                                 
35 Although this study did not test fuel poverty, income closely associated with fuel poverty (Scottish Government, 2016). 
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For the winter of 2015/16 there were 2,850 excess winter deaths in Scotland (NRS, 2016). 
Maintaining high indoor temperatures can help reduce other significant health risks, including 
reduced cardiovascular disease (Khaw, 1995) and respiratory conditions (Howden-Chapman et 
al., 2007), improving mental health (Green & Gilbertson, 2008), as well as reducing 
environmental problems such as mould and condensation (Walker et al, 2006). As expected fuel 
poverty is sensitive to energy prices with a governmental report suggesting that a 5% increase 
in energy prices (similar the green premium used in this study) could push an extra 46,000 
households (or 2% of total households) in Scotland into fuel poverty (Scottish Government, 
2010). Therefore, it is vital from a policy perspective that those unwilling to spend extra for a 
premium green energy default are able to act according to their preferences.  
Proponents of green nudging may argue that the most vulnerable in society can identify when 
they are being nudged and that their financial awareness will override the default effects. 
However, research does not support this. Vulnerable consumers are found to be over-
represented in groups of consumers who do not actively switch energy suppliers (Boardman, 
1991, p 96). Research had shown that living in poverty can have a greater cognitive load on an 
individual which can diminish their performance at decision making (Shal et al, 2012; 
Mullainathan & Shafir, 2014). Lorenc et al. (2013) carried out a study examining the switching 
behaviour in UK consumers who identify as fuel poor. They found that most common reason 
for not switching was apathy or “not bothered”, this was based on reasons such as content with 
the current situation, too tired or stressed, and too old. Other reasons include lack of time, 
loyalty, fear and scepticism. Such behaviour in not switching tariffs could also apply to sticking 
with a default despite not being the preferred choice, countering the argument that nudges are 
fair as they affect all equally36. 
As shown, there is a significant possibility that a green default can manipulate those living in 
fuel poverty to choose a green tariff against their preference, with potentially serious 
implications. From a policy perspective, it is therefore logical to assume that it is unlikely a 
democratic country with high levels of fuel poverty, would introduce a more expensive green 
energy default without evidence that is does not harm some of the most vulnerable in society. 
The introduction of a new policy must be seen as cohesive with existing policies. In Scotland, 
affordable energy is one of main policy aims at reducing fuel poverty37. Those policy makers and 
organisations campaigning for more affordable energy, would want research showing that a 
green default does not harm the most vulnerable in society (arguably the most susceptible). 
Policy makers considering the introduction of green energy defaults cannot overlook this 
concern. 
Therefore one of the key policy implications from this study is that a green energy default may 
be ‘too effective’, and manipulate consumers into a green tariff against their preference. 
Although not able to examine the exact motivations of why consumers stuck with the more 
expensive green tariff, it is hypothesised that those reasons behind the default effects (such as 
inertia, guilt, endorsement) could be overriding preferred decision making. As a result more 
research is needed into the reasons and whether, if so, a default can be designed to minimise 
such effects. As a result, public policy makers should carefully consider the power of a default 
and the potential adverse effects. One hypothesis to reduce manipulation is in line with ethical 
                                                 
36 “Moreover, nudges are fairly easy to understand, and they do not seem to raise strong fairness concerns, as they are equally 
applied to all.” Croson & Treich (2014, pp338). 
37 The statutory duty on the Scottish Government to eradicate fuel poverty by 2016 through the 2001 Housing (Scotland) Act 
was missed. In 2016 both the ‘A Scotland without fuel poverty is a fairer Scotland: Four steps to achieving sustainable, affordable and 
attainable warmth and energy use for all’ and An Action Plan To Deliver Affordable Warmth In Rural Scotland were published to reduce 
fuel poverty. 
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concerns and to disclose not only the ‘ends’ but also the ‘means’ of the default. By stating that 
the reason for the default is for people that have expressed a willingness to pay and can afford 
it, this might reduce guilt for those who cannot. Furthermore, the green tariff should be easy to 
opt-out of and occur no financial cost in doing so. This draws attention back to the first policy 
recommendation, which states that green defaults should come with greater transparency and 
environmental information regarding the environmental benefits. Such information would likely 
increase the strength of the default effects, potentially increasing adverse effects such as 
manipulation. However, with further research into the effects, motivations and their strengths, 
the two policy recommendations can be complimentary. Balancing these two factors will be 
paramount if green energy defaults are to become part of public policy. 
Other policy implications 
Overall green energy defaults have been shown to not accurately classify consumers to their 
preferences. This result also draws attention to other studies that have found high enrolment 
rates with green defaults. Without identifying whether such high enrolment occurs only from 
those who are actually WTP for RE, policy makers should be cautious in using such findings. 
Furthermore, policy makers should recognise that there are low levels of consumer trust in many 
energy markets and as a result defaults in a real market setting may react differently to other 
green nudges and hypothetical studies (Brown & Krishna, 2004). The surprise results from the 
standard default should not be interpreted as an error, but should highlight the how defaults 
can produce very different results depending on context. Accordingly the hypothesis that the 
results in the standard treatment rest in exploiting a lack of trust in the agent, is not a 
recommended approach to environmental policy making. Instead there is a need for further 
research which can replicate real market settings.  
For a default specific policy perspective, it is therefore recommended that along with the general 
requirements for a green tariff (as discussed in chapter 1.1), the introduction of a green energy 
default should adhere to the following principals; 
1. Transparency of the choice architect. When framing a default choice setting, it 
should be clearly stated the identity of the agent behind the decision to adopt a default 
option. For example whether the default decision is due to mandatory regulatory 
requirements, or is a voluntary initiative from the supplier.    
2. Transparency over the aim of the default (the “ends”). To increase trust in the 
default, the aim of the default and the justification of the extra cost (if incurred) should 
be given. This is especially important when the default is more expensive than the other 
alternatives. To reduce the concern of profiteering. Consumers should be provided with 
the level of information they require to make an informed choice, thus reducing 
confusion and scepticism.  
3. Transparency over the default effect (the “means”). If defaults are to implemented 
in public policy making then individuals should be made aware of the why the default is 
used and its effects. Furthermore, by identifying that the default is aimed specifically at 
those who are WTP for a green tariff, this might reduce the potential of manipulation. 
For example those that cannot afford a green tariff might feel less guilty about opting 
out if they know the green tariff is aimed only at those who can.  
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Implications for researchers and energy suppliers 
For researchers, the findings recommend that future studies into the role of green defaults no 
longer only assess the success of such tools through total enrolment alone, but instead assess 
through comparing decisions made when subject to such nudges against the actual preference 
of the participant. Although such studies may yield uncomfortable results, understanding the 
relationships and driving factors will undoubtedly lead to better designed policy tools which can 
be effective and ethical. Furthermore, as this research has shown, behavioural economists and 
energy policy makers can benefit from incorporating more of the works of consumer research, 
especially in environments with low consumer trust, into their research. 
For energy suppliers the results show there is a substantial demand and willingness to pay a 
premium for renewable electricity from energy consumers in Scotland (43%). However, this 
figure is similar to other studies conducted whilst the major energy companies offered green 
tariffs, yet this rarely translated into uptake. As a result, in a UK context, it is unlikely that energy 
companies would consider reintroducing green tariffs, especially as now they are limited to 
supplying only four tariffs. If those supporters of green energy defaults are advocating that 
energy suppliers voluntarily promote green default tariffs, then policy interventions are needed 
to reduce risk to the suppliers. 
 
Finally, the main policy implication is not that policy makers and researchers should abandon 
green energy defaults, but that careful assessment of the default effects is critically needed to 
better design and improve their effectiveness and limit adverse effects. Such defaults can be 
designed however further research is needed to satisfy the concerns over the potential adverse 
effects.  If anything, these results show a clear need for further research in this area before policy 
makers consider implementing green defaults in actual energy markets. 
6.2 Future research 
The findings of this thesis create a departure point for many avenues of new research, however 
the following areas represent arguably the greatest need for further research: 
1) Further studies into the potential for manipulation by green energy defaults and 
methods to reduce such occurrence. Such studies could focus the effect of green energy 
defaults in the most vulnerable consumers. 
2) Further research into the motivation for consumers who still opt-out of a green default 
despite it being their normative preference. This could examine the role of information 
and transparency (see Loewenstein et al, 2015; Bruns et al, 2016 ; Kroese et al, 2016; 
Steffel et al, 2016, for possible methodologies). 
3) In general, develop a robust test to better examine whether stated preference match 
normative preferences. Such a test can be then conducted by future research, which can 
be used to show whether green nudges can be effective as well as ethical. 
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6.3 Critical reflections and final remarks 
Although this thesis did hypothesis that the results of this study would vary from other studies 
due to the different setting, the degree in which the results varied was unexpected. Although 
the survey design was constructed in accordance with other published studies, and approved by 
a panel of energy experts and academics in the field, there are some critical reflections to present. 
First, given the results, collecting the reasons behind why some participants chose a tariff in the 
default that was not their preference would have added value to the study. Although such data 
would by itself not prove specific behavioural theories, such information would have provided 
more insight and strengthened hypotheses. Secondly a better understanding of to what degree 
the results are context dependent could have improved the generalizability of the results. 
Furthermore, providing an option for “no (strong) preference” when asking the participant their 
normative preference could have provided additional benefits. Examining whether those who 
do not have strong preferences react differently under the default situation could have added to 
the policy implications. Furthermore additional data on consumer experience of switching 
tariffs, as well as environmental awareness, could have provided further insight into the working 
of the default effect.  
 
Finally, this study is the first to the author’s knowledge to examine the role of green energy 
defaults through reflecting how the choices made under such situations match actual 
preferences. Although the results suggest that such defaults may not be as effective as previously 
thought (and may even manipulate choices), it is important to stress that these results do not 
argue against a green energy default, but instead highlight the need for careful design and further 
research. It should be the aim of a green energy default to increase enrolment amongst those 
willing, while at the same time protecting the most vulnerable of society. A green energy default 
should not be seen as a tool to encourage enrolment against preferences, instead it should be 
the role of institutions and policy makers should address such concerns, while the role of default 
is to then match such preferences with behaviour. A green energy default should correct market 
failure, not contribute to it. 
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Appendix  
Appendix I 
 
Electricity tariffs and purchase preferences in Scotland  
This survey aims to collect data on consumer behaviour and electricity tariff choices in 
Scotland. All responses are anonymous. 
Thank you for your participation 
 
Are you involved in the decisions regarding the electricity tariff and provider in your 
household?  
Yes  
No  
 
Demographics 
Please fill out the following information to the best of your ability 
 
Gender  
Male  
Female  
 
Age  
16-24  
25-34  
35-44  
45-59  
60-74  
75+  
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Your highest level of qualification  
Degree, professional qualification  
HNC/HND or equivalent  
Higher, A level or equivalent  
Standard Grade, O Grade or equivalent  
Other qualification  
No qualification  
Qualification unknown  
 
Net annual household income (i.e. after taxation and other deductions)  
£0 - £6000  
£6001 - £10000  
£10001 - £15000  
£15001 - £20000  
£20001 - £25000  
£25001 - £30000  
£30001 - £40000  
£40001+  
 
Household location  
Large urban area (settlement of 125,000 people or more)  
Other urban area (settlement of 10,000 to 124,999 people or more)  
Small town (settlement of 3,000 to 9,999 people)  
Rural (settlement of less than 3,000 people)  
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Household tenure  
Owner occupied  
Social rented  
Private rented  
Other  
Household size  
1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7 or more  
 
Green Default Treatment 
  
Please take your time to carefully read the question and respond as if you would in a real-life 
setting.    
Assume you have moved to a new town. You receive a letter from the local electricity 
supplier of that area. They inform you that unless instructed otherwise you will be 
automatically put on their green electricity tariff, where 100% of the electricity comes from 
renewable sources (e.g. hydro, wind, solar, bioenergy). Based on average electricity use, the 
green tariff is expected to cost £2.50/month more than the standard electricity tariff (where 
the electricity comes from a mix of nuclear, fossil fuels and renewables). If you would like 
to switch to the standard tariff you are asked to notify the company. What do you do? 
Stay on the assigned green electricity tariff  
Switch to the standard electricity tariff  
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Standard Default Treatment 
  
Please take your time to carefully read the question and respond as if you would in a real-life 
setting.       
Assume you have moved to a new town. You receive a letter from the local electricity 
supplier of that area. They inform you that unless instructed otherwise you will be 
automatically put on their standard electricity tariff (where the electricity comes from a mix 
of nuclear, fossil fuels and renewables). They also inform you about their green tariff where 
100% of the electricity is generated from renewable sources (e.g. hydro, wind, solar, 
bioenergy). Based on average electricity use, the green tariff is expected to cost £2.50/month 
more than the standard electricity tariff. If you would like to switch to the green tariff you 
are asked to notify the company. What do you do? 
Stay on the assigned standard electricity tariff  
Switch to the green electricity tariff  
 
Active Choice Treatment 
  
Please take your time to carefully read the question and respond as if you would in a real-life 
setting. 
Assume you have moved to a new town. You are informed by the local electricity provider 
of the available tariffs. These are a standard electricity tariff (where the electricity comes 
from a mix of nuclear, fossil fuels and renewables) and a green electricity tariff (where the 
electricity comes from 100% renewable sources, e.g. hydro, wind, solar, bioenergy). Based 
on average electricity use, the green tariff is expected to cost £2.50/month more than the 
standard electricity tariff. You are asked to make an active choice, which do you choose?   
Green electricity tariff  
Standard electricity tariff  
 
In reality, is your current electricity tariff a standard energy tariff or green tariff?  
Green tariff  
Standard energy tariff  
Don't know  
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Would you like to switch to a 100% green electricity tariff (with an extra cost of 
£2.50/month)?  
Yes  
No  
 
What is the reason(s) for not switching to a green tariff?  
Unwilling to spend anymore on electricity than currently am  
Effort and time switching  
Content enough with my current tariff  
Not enough information given on green tariffs  
Do not see the need for a green tariff  
Environmental benefits do not justify the costs  
Mitigating climate change is not my responsibility  
Do not know anyone else with a green tariff  
Other: ______________ 
  
Survey completed. Thank you for your time. 
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Appendix II 
 
Reason Allocation 
“Unable to afford any more.” Unwilling to spend anymore on 
electricity than currently am  
“Price” Unwilling to spend anymore on 
electricity than currently am 
“Moving” Ommited 
“locked in at moment” Ommited 
“it shouldn't cost more” Unwilling to spend anymore on 
electricity than currently am 
“I live next door to the third largest onshore windfarm in the 
UK, I know all about the environmental destruction that 
goes with wind farms and other so called green technology, 
my life is a green as I can get it electricity notwithstanding” 
Environmental benefits do not justify 
the cost  
“Cost” Unwilling to spend anymore on 
electricity than currently am 
“economically challenged but with different financial 
circumstances I would choose the green tariff” 
Unwilling to spend anymore on 
electricity than currently am 
“believe that "standard" Electrical suupy comes from mixed 
sources anyway”  
Ommited 
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Appendix III 
Total group time  
Descriptives 
Group time all   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Green 181 29.2737 16.58840 1.23301 26.8407 31.7067 2.89 95.28 
Standard 161 31.0375 18.41272 1.45113 28.1716 33.9033 2.73 98.67 
Active 
Choice 
154 17.5060 14.24469 1.14787 15.2383 19.7737 2.91 80.66 
Total 496 26.1925 17.51993 .78667 24.6469 27.7381 2.73 98.67 
 
 
ANOVA 
Group time all   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 17117.807 2 8558.903 31.297 .000 
Within Groups 134821.419 493 273.471   
Total 151939.226 495    
 
 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable:   Group time all   
Tukey HSD   
(I) Scenario (J) Scenario 
Mean Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Green Standard -1.76375 1.79150 .587 -5.9752 2.4477 
Active Choice 11.76773* 1.81292 .000 7.5059 16.0296 
Standard Green 1.76375 1.79150 .587 -2.4477 5.9752 
Active Choice 13.53148* 1.86397 .000 9.1496 17.9133 
Active Choice Green -11.76773* 1.81292 .000 -16.0296 -7.5059 
Standard -13.53148* 1.86397 .000 -17.9133 -9.1496 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Timing data according to decision 
Green default treatment 
 
Descriptives 
Group time:   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Stay on the assigned 
green electricity 
tariff 
77 28.67 15.456 1.761 25.16 32.17 3 72 
Switch to the 
standard electricity 
tariff 
104 29.72 17.439 1.710 26.33 33.11 3 95 
Total 181 29.27 16.588 1.233 26.84 31.71 3 95 
 
 
ANOVA 
Group time:   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 49.367 1 49.367 .179 .673 
Within Groups 49482.110 179 276.436   
Total 49531.478 180    
 
 
Standard default treatment 
 
Descriptives 
Group time:   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Switch to the green 
electricity tariff 
77 30.07 18.085 2.061 25.96 34.17 3 83 
Stay on the assigned 
standard electricity 
tariff 
84 31.93 18.772 2.048 27.85 36.00 6 99 
Total 161 31.04 18.413 1.451 28.17 33.90 3 99 
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ANOVA 
Group time:   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 139.434 1 139.434 .410 .523 
Within Groups 54105.087 159 340.284   
Total 54244.521 160    
 
 
Active choice treatment 
 
Descriptives 
Group time:   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Green electricity 
tariff 
35 26.70 15.177 2.565 21.49 31.92 5 78 
Standard electricity 
tariff 
119 14.80 12.817 1.175 12.47 17.13 3 81 
Total 154 17.51 14.245 1.148 15.24 19.77 3 81 
 
 
ANOVA 
Group time:   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 3830.859 1 3830.859 21.396 .000 
Within Groups 27214.562 152 179.043   
Total 31045.420 153    
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Timing data according to WTP 
TOTAL 
 
Descriptives 
Group time all   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Yes 215 24.7193 16.81584 1.14683 22.4588 26.9798 2.73 83.02 
No 281 27.3197 17.98832 1.07309 25.2074 29.4321 2.95 98.67 
Total 496 26.1925 17.51993 .78667 24.6469 27.7381 2.73 98.67 
 
 
ANOVA 
Group time all   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 823.660 1 823.660 2.693 .101 
Within Groups 151115.566 494 305.902   
Total 151939.226 495    
 
 
GREEN DEFAULT 
 
Descriptives 
Group time:   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Yes 71 23.93 13.057 1.550 20.84 27.02 3 71 
No 110 32.72 17.728 1.690 29.37 36.08 4 95 
Total 181 29.27 16.588 1.233 26.84 31.71 3 95 
 
 
ANOVA 
Group time:   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 3339.890 1 3339.890 12.943 .000 
Within Groups 46191.588 179 258.054   
Total 49531.478 180    
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STANDARD DEFAULT 
 
Descriptives 
Group time:   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Yes 80 30.10 18.417 2.059 26.00 34.19 3 83 
No 81 31.97 18.475 2.053 27.88 36.05 6 99 
Total 161 31.04 18.413 1.451 28.17 33.90 3 99 
 
 
ANOVA 
Group time:   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 140.938 1 140.938 .414 .521 
Within Groups 54103.583 159 340.274   
Total 54244.521 160    
 
 
ACTIVE CHOICE 
 
Descriptives 
Group time:   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Yes 64 18.88 16.543 2.068 14.75 23.01 3 81 
No 90 16.53 12.360 1.303 13.94 19.12 3 56 
Total 154 17.51 14.245 1.148 15.24 19.77 3 81 
 
 
ANOVA 
Group time:   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 206.000 1 206.000 1.015 .315 
Within Groups 30839.421 152 202.891   
Total 31045.420 153    
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Timing data for those WTP in active choice treatment 
 
Descriptives 
Group time:   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Green electricity 
tariff 
31 26.48 15.196 2.729 20.91 32.06 5 78 
Standard electricity 
tariff 
33 11.73 14.618 2.545 6.55 16.92 3 81 
Total 64 18.88 16.543 2.068 14.75 23.01 3 81 
 
 
ANOVA 
Group time:   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 3476.361 1 3476.361 15.657 .000 
Within Groups 13765.665 62 222.027   
Total 17242.025 63    
 
Timing data analysis for those not WTP in the green default 
 
Descriptives 
Group time:   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Green electricity 
tariff 
19 36.46 20.203 4.635 26.72 46.20 7 72 
Standard electricity 
tariff 
91 31.95 17.189 1.802 28.37 35.53 4 95 
Total 110 32.72 17.728 1.690 29.37 36.08 4 95 
 
 
ANOVA 
Group time:   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 320.156 1 320.156 1.019 .315 
Within Groups 33938.310 108 314.244   
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Total 34258.465 109    
 
Timing data analysis for those WTP in the green default 
 
Descriptives 
Group time:   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Green electricity 
tariff 
58 26.11 12.758 1.675 22.76 29.47 3 71 
Standard electricity 
tariff 
13 14.17 9.745 2.703 8.28 20.06 3 29 
Total 71 23.93 13.057 1.550 20.84 27.02 3 71 
 
 
ANOVA 
Group time:   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1515.664 1 1515.664 10.039 .002 
Within Groups 10417.458 69 150.978   
Total 11933.122 70    
 
Timing data when those that answered the treatment questions in less than 
five seconds were removed 
 
Descriptives 
Group time all   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Green 174 30.3040 16.08353 1.21929 27.8974 32.7106 5.82 95.28 
Standard 160 31.2144 18.33274 1.44933 28.3520 34.0768 5.45 98.67 
Active 
Choice 
135 19.4136 14.20992 1.22299 16.9948 21.8325 5.01 80.66 
Total 469 27.4798 17.15006 .79192 25.9237 29.0360 5.01 98.67 
 
 
ANOVA 
Harry Moncreiff, IIIEE, Lund University 
82 
Group time all   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 12402.912 2 6201.456 23.073 .000 
Within Groups 125247.332 466 268.771   
Total 137650.245 468    
 
 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable:   Group time all   
Tukey HSD   
(I) Scenario (J) Scenario 
Mean Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Green Standard -.91035 1.79568 .868 -5.1324 3.3117 
Active Choice 10.89039* 1.88031 .000 6.4694 15.3114 
Standard Green .91035 1.79568 .868 -3.3117 5.1324 
Active Choice 11.80075* 1.91591 .000 7.2960 16.3055 
Active Choice Green -10.89039* 1.88031 .000 -15.3114 -6.4694 
Standard -11.80075* 1.91591 .000 -16.3055 -7.2960 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Appendix IV 
Regression in active choice 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step 1a Group time 
all 
-.088 .027 10.756 1 .001 .916 .869 .965 
Constant 1.588 .516 9.470 1 .002 4.892   
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Group time all. 
 
 
Classification Tablea 
 
Observed 
Predicted 
 
Decision 
Percentage 
Correct 
 
Green electricity 
tariff 
Standard 
electricity tariff 
Step 1 Decision Green electricity tariff 23 8 74.2 
Standard electricity tariff 5 28 84.8 
Overall Percentage   79.7 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 72.225a .226 .302 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because 
parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
 
 
